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California’s criminal justice system has been the subject of multiple reforms in the last decade. 
Prison populations in California continually grew until several key reforms were implemented. 
State and local expenditures on the corrections system increased significantly, as well. These 
issues have long been the topic of debate for politicians, criminologists, and residents alike. 
Scholars attribute the explosive increase in prison populations to the highly criticized tough on 
crime era of criminal justice policy (Bird, Lofstrom, Martin, Raphael, & Nguyen, 2018).  
There are more people incarcerated in the United States than any other country in the 
world (Mcleod, 2017; Trout, 2011; Natapoff, 2015; Walmsley, 2018). According to the World 
Brief Prison Population List, in 2018, there were approximately 2.1 million people incarcerated 
in the United States of America (Walmsley, 2018). China was the runner-up, with about 1.65 
million people incarcerated (Walmsley, 2018). The fact that the United States is incarcerating 
people at a much higher rate than China, a country with over four times the total population, is 
concerning (Walmsley, 2018). While it is difficult to get consistent quantitative data when 
researching prison populations (due in part to differences in reporting standards at the city, state, 
and country levels and differences in who is designated as “incarcerated”), the overall 
incarceration rate estimates are similar across the board. The Prison Policy Initiative estimates 
the incarceration rate in the United States in 2018 was 698 for every 100,000 people (Wagner & 
Sawyer, 2018). The World Prison Brief estimated it to be 655 for every 100,000 people 
(Walmsley, 2018).  







Table 1: Incarceration Rates in the USA and Other Countries (2018) 
Country Incarceration Rate  
per 100,000 people 
Estimated National 
Population 
United States of America 655 323.90 million 
El Salvador 604 6.41 million 
Cuba 510 11.25 million 
Russian Federation 402 144.9 million 
Mexico 164 124.43 million 
Spain 126 46.76 million 
China 118 1,397 million 
Canada 114 35.94 million 
India 33 1,289.7 million 
Source: (Walmsley, 2018).   
From these data, it is evident that the United States incarcerates people at a much higher 
rate than other countries in the world. Given such a high incarceration rate, it follows that 
correctional facilities are being filled to capacity and, in some cases, are overcrowded. Bleich 
(1989) describes the word “overcrowding” as being redundant. He explains that the word 
“crowding” describes a state in which there are more than a desirable amount of people in a 
given location, so the word “overcrowding” is simply an overstatement used as a means to a 
political end. Bleich contends that “overcrowding” is mostly a matter of perception, consisting of 
what society deems acceptable at a certain time, instead of a simple comparison of building 
capacity and current occupancy.  
As a result, the levels of crowding which are considered acceptable may differ from place 
to place. Bleich (1989) contends that criminal justice stakeholders take advantage of this 
perception to achieve their own goals. He explains that in a situation where a facility is operating 
above capacity, administrators use the level of crowding as justification for more funding, 
inmates use it to obtain reduced sentences, and lawmakers use it as justification to pass new laws 





Overcrowding in correctional facilities can lead to a multitude of problems. These 
include an increase in acts of violence between inmates and against staff, health issues, 
psychological issues among both inmates and staff, administrative concerns like funding and 
staffing, and difficulty providing adequate services to inmates for the purpose of rehabilitation 
(Bleich, 1998; Pitts et al. 2014; Petersilia, 2014; Landsberg, 2014). As a result, state and local 
governments ultimately pay more to address these issues while continuing to operate 
overcrowded correctional facilities in a safe manner. Additional expenditures arise from the need 
to increase staffing levels for safety reasons, the need to increase the overall capacity of a 
facility, and increased medical costs.  
AB 109 
California has been subject to federal oversight in regards to its prison population for the past 
decade. In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) upheld a California court 
ruling that mandated a drastic reduction of the prison population in California (Schlanger, 2013; 
Petersilia, 2014; Pitts et al., 2014; Kelso, 2014). Assembly Bill 109 (A.B. 109), passed in 2011, 
was a concerted effort to reduce prison overcrowding in response to this court mandate 
(Schlanger, 2013). AB 109 was designed and implemented rather quickly for criminal justice 
reform. It was proposed in January of 2011, approved in March and enacted in October of the 
same year (Lofstrom & Martin, 2015).  
AB 109 identified offenders whose felony convictions were deemed to be for non-
serious, non-sexual, and non-violent offenses (Legislative Analyst Office [LAO], 2015a). 
Offenders in this category who were serving sentences in state prison could be released early and 
supervised by local probation departments or transferred to county jail facilities to finish serving 





could serve their sentence at a county jail facility instead of state prison. These changes affected 
a significant number of offenders and reduced the prison population in California. Although AB 
109 significantly altered the way the criminal justice system in California operates, it did not 
have enough of an impact meet the court-imposed population caps. It did, however, lay the 
foundation for several other criminal justice policy reform measures that ultimately allowed the 
state to meet the prison population goals. One such measure was Proposition 47. AB 109 and 
other criminal justice reforms will be explored in more detail in a subsequent section. 
Proposition 47 
Three years after the implementation of AB 109, a second criminal justice reform policy was 
passed for the purpose of gaining compliance with the court mandate. The “Safe Schools and 
Neighborhoods Act,” otherwise known as Proposition 47, was passed in 2014. Proposition 47 
was proposed through the ballot initiative process, and went into effect on November 5th, 2014 
after being approved by a majority vote (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). While AB 109 focused on 
shifting the responsibility for certain felony offenders from the state level to the county level, 
Proposition 47 reduced penalties for certain offenses and diverted funding from incarceration to 
K-12 Schools and other social programs (Office of the Attorney General [OAG], 2013).  
 Proposition 47 reduced penalties for “low-level” misdemeanors, and allowed for 
individuals who had been convicted of these offenses to apply for reclassification of their 
convictions (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015; LAO, 2015a; Males, 2016; Naimo, 2016). Individuals who 
were serving sentences for crimes with newly reduced penalties were allowed to petition for 
resentencing under the new guidelines (Males, 2016; Naimo, 2016). The reduced penalties and 
pathways for relief allowed for inmates to be released earlier than expected, reduced the number 





received if they did face the prospect of incarceration. These changes also affected a significant 
number of offenders, ultimately allowing the state prison population to fall below the court-
imposed population caps for the first time. Proposition 47 will be explored in more detail in 
subsequent sections. 
A process evaluation was conducted using publicly available data from numerous sources 
in order to determine whether Proposition 47 had been implemented in a way that was consistent 
with its stated purpose over the last six years. This project also reviewed the relevant facets of 
the criminal justice system at the state, county and city levels in order to illustrate its long-term 
impacts. In reviewing the local impact of the implementation of Proposition 47, the County of 
Santa Clara and the City of Campbell were the focus of this research. 
Problem Statement 
Proposition 47 made drastic changes to California’s criminal justice system. Critics and 
proponents of the measure have made sweeping claims about its impact on crime trends and the 
criminal justice system, in general. However, many of these claims are based on assumptions and 
are not based on actual data and research. Given the fact that California’s prison population is 
still subject to court oversight, it is essential that the effectiveness of Proposition 47 as a solution 
to this issue be evaluated. If the state hopes to maintain compliance with the court-mandated 
prison population caps, it must ensure to exhaust all possible legislative solutions. This includes 
evaluating policy reforms that have already been implemented to determine whether they are 
sufficient to address the issue, whether other kinds of solutions should be considered, or whether 
any changes to the current solution are necessary. To this end, this project explored the 
implementation of Proposition 47 over the last five years, as well as its impact on the number of 






Has Proposition 47 been effective in reducing prison overcrowding, while not enhancing 
criminal activity in communities? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Gap in Literature 
Since Proposition 47 was implemented just over five years ago, there has been very little in-
depth empirical research regarding its implementation, effectiveness, and impacts on the criminal 
justice system and society. The majority of literature specific to Proposition 47 consists of 
research reports detailing expected outcomes, or outcomes within the first year of 
implementation. Scholarly research is essential for documenting and analyzing the impact of 
criminal justice reforms. This project seeks to begin to fill this gap in the literature specific to 
Proposition 47.  
Prior to reviewing existing Proposition 47 literature, a general review of criminal justice 
reforms and alternatives to incarceration is helpful in understanding the theoretical foundation 
for measures like Proposition 47. These reforms and alternatives include decriminalization, 
sentencing reform, reclassification of offenses, provisions for early release, and changes to the 
bail system. The sociopolitical factors preceding the implementation of Proposition 47 also 
provide useful background information when exploring this topic.  
History of Reform in the US 
One of the most prominent themes in academic research is that harsh sentencing laws are one of 
the key factors contributing to prison overcrowding (Ristroph, 2006; Brown, 2007; Yantus, 
2014; Reisinger, 2019). Several scholars have described sentencing laws in the United States as a 





Stuntz 2001; Tonry, 2013). They contend that there has been a boom in the number of 
misdemeanors created and prosecuted, which leads to “overcriminalization” (Ball, 2014; 
Natapoff, 2015; Baughman, 2018). An increase in criminal codes leads to an increase in arrests, 
which in turn leads to an increase in cases being prosecuted. This inherently means that more 
people have criminal records. Over time, legislators have implemented several different kinds of 
criminal justice reforms to address the issue of overcriminalization and increasing incarceration 
rates. These include decriminalization, various types of sentencing reform, the reclassification of 
offenses, the retroactive reduction of penalties, provisions for early release, and bail reform. 
Each of these reforms will be discussed briefly in the subsequent sections. 
Scholars call for sentencing reform in order to reduce correctional facility populations 
(Yantus, 2014). Most states examined their incarceration rates and implemented some type of 
sentencing reform in the 1970s and 1980s (Tonry, 2013; Sullivan, 2013; Pitts et al., 2014; 
Yantus, 2014). A majority of the sentencing reform that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s served 
to increase mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses, which resulted in increased 
incarceration rates (Dansky, 2008; Ristroph, 2006; Sebba, 2013; Tonry, 2013). There was an 
increase in the number of offenders being incarcerated, as well as an increase in the length of 
time they were sentenced to. Some reasons for this include moral panics such as the War on 
Drugs, and politicians who wanted to be perceived as being tough on crime (Pinard, 2010; 
Tonry, 2013; Sullivan, 2013) One example of this is the three-strikes law in California which led 







It is undoubtedly easier to add new criminal codes and increase penalties for existing crimes than 
it is to decriminalize or reclassify offenses. Some examples of offenses that have been 
decriminalized are the distribution of contraception, interracial marriage, gambling, and the 
consumption of alcohol. While it may seem obvious now that these are offenses that should have 
been decriminalized, it is difficult to decriminalize crimes against persons, property, or certain 
drug-related offenses. Some states have opted for reducing penalties associated with certain 
crimes or reclassifying them altogether, instead of resorting to full decriminalization (Brown, 
2007).  
Sentencing Reform 
Incapacitation is often the primary criminological theory used as a basis for an increase in 
sentence lengths (Tonry, 2013). Gazal-Ayal (2013) claims that one way to prevent harsh, 
arbitrary sentences is to refrain from using the theory of incapacitation as justification for the 
length of a sentence. If the person responsible for deciding on the length of a sentence is not 
driven by the desire to exile an offender from society, the sentence would ultimately be much 
shorter and would allow for re-entry much sooner. When considering sentencing reform, it is 
always necessary to determine how the punishment will fit the crime. Tonry (2013) states that 
the prevailing attitude driving current sentencing policy has changed to prioritize consistency and 
the concept of “just deserts” instead of incapacitation.  
Ristroph (2006) examines the theory of “deserts” as a justification for the amount of 
punishment associated with any given crime. She contends that offenders should only be given a 
sentence they deserve based on the crime that was committed. The problem with this construct 
lies in that the concept of what one deserves is subject to personal interpretation (Gazal-Ayal, 





consensus that a certain offender deserves somewhere between ten and fifteen years for the crime 
he committed, it would be extremely difficult to determine if he deserved precisely ten, eleven or 
twelve years for the same crime (Ristroph, 2006).  
Two of the main sentencing reforms implemented at the federal level are the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 and the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act 
established federal guidelines with regards to sentencing (Krent, 2013; DiVita, 2015). The 
purpose of this was to maximize uniformity in sentencing and to make sure that defendants were 
being sentenced fairly, regardless of their gender or background (Howell, 2004). The Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 addressed the disparity between sentences for crack cocaine offenses and 
those for powder cocaine offenses (Krent, 2013; DiVita, 2015). Krent (2013) explains that in 
Dorsey v. United States, the Supreme Court decided that new sentencing changes would only 
apply to offenders who were still in the process of being sentenced (whose sentences had not 
been finalized) and new offenders. This created new disparities between those who were 
sentenced for the same offense before the law was passed, and those sentenced after it was 
passed (Reisinger, 2019).  
This situation illustrates how Congress has the final say on whether or not a sentence 
reduction is retroactively applied (Reisinger, 2019). DiVita (2015) argued that offenders 
previously convicted of the same offense should have their sentences reduced as well, especially 
since many of them had received reduced sentences as a result of their cooperation with law 
enforcement. Although their sentences were technically reduced at the time they were imposed, 
they were often still longer than the new maximum sentences under the Fair Sentencing Act 
(DiVita, 2015).  





Retroactively applying a reduction of penalties would not cause an undue hardship on affected 
individuals, as they would likely welcome a shorter sentence. It would certainly result in 
financial savings for the corrections department and state, due to an increase in offenders being 
released earlier than initially expected. The only negative consequence would be that a reduction 
of previously imposed sentences inevitably means more offenders re-entering society (Reisinger, 
2019). While this is favorable through the lens of reducing prison overcrowding, it can be argued 
that it may be detrimental to the overall public safety. Applying a sentencing reduction 
retroactively could create more work for the criminal justice system in general. Reisinger (2019) 
argues that the workload increase would be minimal because it would not require an entire 
resentencing process. There is a general consensus among scholars that new sentence reductions 
should retroactively apply to all offenders convicted of the same offense (Krent, 2013; DiVita, 
2015; Reisinger, 2019). 
Sentencing guidelines 
Another type of sentencing reform involves modifying the current use of sentencing guidelines. 
According to Chanenson (2005), sentencing guidelines can be voluntary (judges can disregard 
them if they choose to do so), advisory (judges must take them into consideration), or allow for 
little discretion (judges have no real flexibility in sentencing). Sentencing guidelines are 
beneficial because discretion during sentencing has the potential to create large disparities in 
sentencing; however, the guidelines themselves can also allow for large disparities due to public 
sentiment, like tough on crime political agendas (Gazal-Ayal, 2013).  Individual jurisdictions 
could decide that their current sentencing guidelines are too lenient, too harsh, or allow for too 





Sentencing guidelines also have the potential to reduce sentencing disparities wrongly 
based on factors unrelated to the crime. For example, female offenders tend to get shorter 
sentences than their male counterparts for the same offenses (Gazal-Ayal, 2013). There are so 
many variations in sentencing and sentencing guidelines that comprehensive research on the 
topic is very difficult (Sebba, 2013). However, it is essential that the length of sentences, along 
with crime and offender characteristics, are carefully tracked in order to determine the best way 
to move forward with sentencing reform (Gazal-Ayal, 2013). 
Gazal-Ayal (2013) also studied sentencing laws around the world. He explains that while 
the United States generally focuses more on reducing disparities in sentencing, other countries 
like England and Australia believe sentences can (and should) vary from person to person. 
Australia specifies a range within which the sentence has to fall, and the judge has the discretion 
to determine what is the appropriate sentence length within that range. This is reminiscent of 
Ristroph’s (2006) point regarding the ease with which the public can agree on an acceptable 
sentence range for a certain offense, but not on an exact sentence length. While this practice may 
result in some sentencing disparity, it should not be too pronounced, since all sentences would 
fall within the previously agreed-upon sentencing range (Gazal-Ayal, 2013).  
Reduction of Sentences 
Another type of sentencing reform is simply reducing the penalties associated with certain 
offenses. Between 1980 and 2005, the number of prisoners incarcerated for drug offenses 
increased by more than one thousand percent (Pinard, 2010). Several states sought to address this 
by implementing policies that reduced penalties for drug offenses, thereby reducing the number 
of non-violent offenders who are occupying prison beds (Piper et al. 2003; Sullivan, 2013, 





Act of 2010. The potential benefits of reducing penalties for certain offenses include reduced 
incarceration rates and the subsequent cost savings for state and local government (Natapoff, 
2015). 
Natapoff (2015) argues that reducing the penalties for certain offenses actually makes it 
easier for the criminal justice system to charge people with crimes and impose sanctions, as well 
as supervision requirements. She also contends it would reduce the affected individuals’ access 
to counsel, since they are merely being issued a citation. Another consideration is that offenders 
could be incarcerated for the crime eventually if they are unable to pay fines associated to newly 
resentenced crimes (Natapoff, 2015).  
Reclassification  
There are three crime classifications in California: felonies, misdemeanors, and infractions.  The 
most serious offenses (such as rape or murder) would be classified as felonies. Misdemeanors 
(such as battery and petty theft) are one level below felonies and are generally not considered as 
serious. The lowest-level crimes are classified as infractions (such as minor traffic violations). 
Some crimes are considered wobblers meaning prosecutors and judges have the discretion to 
charge them as a misdemeanor or as a felony (LAO, 2015a). 
The reclassification of criminal offenses means that they are changed from one 
classification to another. Typically, this consists of a felony being reduced to a lower-level 
classification. This differs from decriminalization because the offense remains a crime, it is just 
lowered in severity. Over ten years ago, states like Alabama and Colorado raised the minimum 
dollar value needed to classify a theft-related offense as a felony, and several states have since 





offenses were ultimately charged as misdemeanors instead of felonies. The changes implemented 
by Proposition 47 were consistent with reclassification of certain offenses.  
Provisions for early release 
Another kind of criminal justice reform involves creating pathways for incarcerated individuals 
to earn an early release. This kind of reform is only available to certain offenders, and is 
typically based on the amount of time they have already served. If an offender is eligible for 
early release, he or she would be allowed to petition for one if he or she accumulated sufficient 
credits through this newly established pathway. Offenders can earn credits through participation 
in educational programming or by exhibiting good behavior (Sullivan, 2013). An example of this 
reform is Senate Bill 678 (SB 678) in California, which is discussed in a subsequent section. 
Other alternative viewpoints 
Alternatives to incarceration are often recommended in order to reduce prison populations 
(Bleich, 1989; Pitts et al., 2014). Some states had alternatives like community work programs in 
place as early as 1979 (Bleich, 1989). Scholars contend that alternatives are not taken seriously, 
and are often used as a last resort (Pitts et al., 2014). Pitts et al. (2014) refer to the “construction 
strategy” as a solution to overcrowding (p. 129). This is what was proposed in 2007 with the 
Public Safety Offender Rehabilitation Services Act of 2007 (Misenas, 2010). Pitts et al. (2014) 
determined that the costs associated with this are exponential. This essentially equates to 
building more prisons, or at least an expansion of current facilities, in order to accommodate the 
ever-growing prison population. While this is an option to reduce overcrowding short-term, it is 
not feasible long-term and defeats the purpose of attempting to reduce incarceration rates.  
Other scholars contend that changing the bail system would further reduce overcrowding. 





main explanations for high incarceration rates. California reformed its bail system in 2018 under 
SB 10, allowing individuals who were in custody (as a result of being unable to afford to pay 
bail) to be released while waiting for their trial to commence (Egelko, 2018). This was 
accomplished through the use of risk assessment tools meant to balance the offenders’ “right to 
liberty with the need to maintain victim and public safety” (Harris, Goss, & Gumbs, 2019). 
While the reform intended that only non-violent offenders be eligible for release, recent cases 
have demonstrated the potential for violent offenders to slip through the cracks (Trujillo, 2020). 
SB 10 was scheduled to appear on the November 2020 ballot after being challenged by an 
interest group (Mcgough, 2019). 
A review of the scholarly research tends to show that any real solution to the problem of 
overcrowding will require a comprehensive approach that would pull from several of the 
aforementioned strategies. Nguyen (2015) studied the state of Arkansas that, in 2011, 
implemented a policy that provided alternatives to incarceration for non-violent offenders. This 
policy also reclassified felonies to misdemeanors, made improvements to community 
supervision, and incentivized community organizations whose primary purpose is to assist with 
rehabilitation (Nguyen, 2015). Arkansas saw extremely positive results in regards to recidivism, 
employment, and cost savings after the implementation of this policy (Nguyen, 2015). Georgia, 
Kentucky, and Texas implemented similar laws, which reduced penalties and had similar results 
(Nguyen, 2015). This is essentially what Proposition 47 sought to achieve.  
Plata v. Brown 
Overcrowded conditions in California prisons are not a new issue. The state has been attempting 
to solve the problem of overcrowding for at least the last three decades (Misenas, 2010; Pitts et 





the first day it opened (Dansky, 2008; Fazzi, 2013). Conditions within overcrowded California 
prisons became so unbearable that inmates and their advocates sought legal action (LAO, 
2015a). As a result, there have been several court rulings ordering a reduction in the number of 
people who are incarcerated (Schlanger, 2013; Petersilia, 2014; Pitts et al., 2014; Kelso, 2014). 
On January 12th, 2009, a specially convened panel of three federal judges ordered California to 
reduce its prison population to 167% of design capacity within six months, 155% of design 
capacity within twelve months, and 137.5% of design capacity within eighteen months (Coleman 
v. Schwarzenegger, 2010; Schlanger, 2013; LAO, 2015b). The Supreme Court of the United 
States (SCOTUS) reviewed this court order in November of 2010 and decided the case in May of 
2011 (Brown v. Plata, 2011).  
In the Brown v. Plata (2011) case, the SCOTUS agreed that the level of overcrowding in 
California prisons had created conditions that were tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment, 
which is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Sullivan (2013) 
states that in this case, SCOTUS had to choose between “two evils,” allowing unconstitutional 
conditions within prisons or releasing potentially dangerous offenders into society (p. 450). 
Kelso (2014), states that the concept of basic human dignity was the driving principle behind the 
Brown v. Plata decision. SCOTUS recognized that although the people affected in this case had 
been convicted of serious criminal offenses, they were still human beings who deserved to be 
treated with dignity (Kelso, 2014). The court decided to uphold the prison population reduction 
order issued by the three-judge panel in 2009. California was ordered to reduce the overall prison 
population by twenty-five percent within two years (Petersilia, 2014). Table 2 contains 
information regarding the court-ordered population caps and deadlines for California Department 





Table 2: Court-Ordered Prison Population Cap 
Deadlines Design capacity of 
CDCR prisons 
Population cap 
(Percent of design capacity) 
Inmates Allowed in 
CDCR Prisons 
6/30/14 - 2/27/15 82,707 143% 118,271 
2/28/15 - 2/27/16 82,707 141.5% 117,030 
After 2/27/16 85,082 137.5% 116,988 
Source: (LAO, 2016). 
Assembly Bill 109 
In an attempt to comply with the prison population reduction order from Brown v. Plata (2011) 
without arbitrarily releasing thousands of criminals, California passed and implemented the 
Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109), which was implemented in 2011 (Fazzi, 2013; 
Lofstrom & Martin, 2015). AB 109 created a new category of offenders called the “non-non-
non,” meaning they had been convicted of non-violent, non-serious, non-sexual crimes that were 
also, coincidentally, classified as felonies (Fazzi, 2013, LAO, 2015a; Lofstrom & Martin, 2015). 
If offenders were convicted of a “non-non-non” crime, and had no previous convictions for such 
a crime, their incarceration or supervision could be transferred to the county level. One serious 
problem with this, however, is that just because an offender has no prior conviction for a serious, 
violent, or sexual crime, does not mean he has not been involved in or charged with one. Many 
criminal cases are pled down to lesser charges or are not filed at all, leaving the record silent on 
an offender’s true and complete criminal history.  
Regardless, new offenders (or offenders arrested for new offenses) who were convicted 
of felonies that were deemed to be non-violent and non-serious could be sentenced to serve time 
in county jail instead of prison (LAO, 2015a). This resulted in an immediate reduction in the 
overall prison population (Schlanger, 2013). Prior to realignment, county jails only housed 
inmates who had been convicted of crimes for which the maximum punishment was less than a 





inmates serving a variety of longer sentences (Fazzi, 2013; Lofstrom & Martin, 2015). AB 109 
also allowed individuals who violated the terms of their community supervision to serve their 
sentence in county jail instead of going back to prison (Lofstrom & Martin, 2015).  
One of the reasons for making such a drastic change to California’s criminal justice 
system was the fact that county jails had bed space available, while state prisons were 
considerably overcrowded (Schlanger, 2013). While it seemed to be a viable option, the transfer 
of convicted felons from the state to the county level was expected to result in jails becoming 
overcrowded as well (Fazzi, 2013). The subsequent need to reduce overcrowding in county jails 
could result in some offenders being released earlier than expected, which is a public safety 
concern (Pinard, 2010; Fazzi, 2013; Petersilia, 2014). Interestingly enough, Justice Scalia 
expressed this same concern in his dissenting opinion in the Brown v. Plata (2011) case 
(Schlanger, 2013).  
It is also important to note that this type of mass release of prisoners had been attempted 
before, with less than positive results. A similar situation took place in Philadelphia in 1987 after 
prisoners sought to remedy overcrowded conditions through legal action (Sullivan, 2013). A 
prison population cap was imposed, which resulted in prisoners being released early (Sullivan, 
2013). Over 9,500 of the prisoners who were released in Philadelphia were rearrested for new 
criminal offenses between January of 1993 and June of 1994 (Sullivan, 2013; Gibeaut, 2011). 
According to Gibeaut (2011), the offenses they were arrested for included 79 murders, over 
1,000 assaults, over 950 robberies, 90 rapes, 14 kidnappings, and over 2,000 offenses involving 
drug sales.  





Petersilia (2014) interviewed criminal justice officials at the local level after the implementation 
of AB 109. She found that while they were optimistic about its potential to create positive long-
term change, probation officials and public defenders struggled to keep up with their newly 
increased caseload. Public defenders mentioned that judges were not imposing split sentences 
(the concept of serving only a portion of jail time and serving the remainder of their sentence 
under probation or some sort of community supervision), and that offenders often chose to serve 
longer jail sentences instead of being released early with probation. They were concerned that 
after completing their sentence, offenders re-entered the community with no supervision and no 
access to resources. Prosecutors also felt a significant amount of work was put into the 
investigation, arrest, and prosecution of offenders, only to have the offender sentenced to little or 
no time in jail. This view was echoed by police officers who also believed AB 109 contributed to 
an increase in crime rates and a corresponding decrease in overall public safety (Petersilia, 
2014).  
Public safety realignment essentially resulted in a shifting of the overcrowding problem, 
leading to more offenders being released early from county jails in order to maintain jail 
populations within acceptable capacity levels (Petersilia, 2014). After the implementation of AB 
109, county jails became overcrowded almost immediately, and released over 14,000 inmates in 
September of 2014 due to these conditions (Lofstrom & Martin, 2015). However, it was 
ultimately determined that the decrease in prison populations as a result of AB 109 was greater 
than the resulting increase in county jail populations (Lofstrom & Martin, 2015). The change in 
the county jail inmate population resulted in an increase in violence against staff members 
(Lofstrom & Martin, 2015). Corrections officials believed that the influx of new offenders 





The concerns which arose from AB 109 included the influx of higher-level offenders into 
county-level supervision, increased violence in the jails, the early release of offenders into 
society with little or no supervision and resources, and a decrease in the overall safety of the 
public due to these factors. These concerns are similar to the concerns that arose as a result of the 
implementation of Proposition 47. Research has shown that public safety realignment has not 
contributed to an increase in violent crime, but has increased property crimes, specifically auto 
thefts by about 17% (Lofstrom & Martin, 2015).  
Research has also shown that for every dollar spent on incarceration, there are only 
twenty-three cents in crime-related savings (Lofstrom & Martin, 2015). Lofstrom and Martin 
(2015) concluded that there was no evidence that AB 109 had any impact on recidivism rates. 
The state gave each county about $1 billion to assist with the implementation of AB 109 (LAO, 
2015a). Although it was expected that public safety realignment would result in cost savings 
when it comes to spending on corrections, California has continually spent more on corrections 
(Lofstrom & Martin, 2015). The following section provides further information about the cost of 
the corrections system in California. 
Corrections Spending 
Owning, operating, and maintaining correctional facilities is costly (Trout, 2011). California 
allocated about $8.2 billion to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in 
2009 (State of California [CA], 2010). Correctional facility operating expenses include 
infrastructure (water and utilities), staffing (security and operations), supplies (food and 
equipment), medical services, and rehabilitative programming (Trout, 2011). California currently 





corrections budget trends in California and Santa Clara County. Figure A is a chart showing the 
funding allocated to the CDCR per year in the State of California from 2008 to 2019. 
Figure A: California State Budget Allocations to the CDCR (2008-2019) 
 
Source: (State of CA, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2016, 2017, 2018, 
2020a). 
Figure A shows that there has been a steady increase in the amount of money allocated to 
CDCR by the state. The budget allocation to CDCR rose significantly in 2011 as compared to 
2010, and there was a significant decrease in the budget between 2011 and 2012. Since then, the 
budget has increased steadily year after year. The increase in state spending on corrections seems 
to be correlated with the implementation of AB 109 in 2011. 
Scholars agree that most criminal justice reforms in the United States have been spurred 
by a need to solve a budget crisis rather than the need to reduce overcrowding (Fazzi, 2013; 





trying to solve the issue of overcrowding during a budget crisis may not create an environment in 
which key stakeholders will be willing or able to come up with long-term solutions. In 2008, a 
fiscal emergency was declared in California after the passage of the Public Safety Offender 
Rehabilitation Services Act, which mandated an expansion of correctional facilities to 
accommodate the increased number of prisoners (Misenas, 2010).  Although the legislative intent 
was to reduce overcrowding through construction, there simply was not enough money in the 
budget to fund new construction projects. California was spending over $9 billion each year on 
the criminal justice system at the time (Misenas, 2010; State of CA, 2008).  
Similarly, California was facing a large budget deficit of $25.4 billion at the beginning of 
2011, prior to the implementation of AB 109 (State of CA, 2011; Fazzi, 2013). Fazzi (2013) 
explains that Governor Brown created AB 109 as part of a larger plan designed to reduce the 
budget deficit. Along with new inmates, AB 109 allocated additional funds to every county to 
assist with the transition (Schlanger, 2013). Each county was given the ability to allocate the 
money as they saw fit. Some counties opted for the construction strategy – choosing to build new 
facilities or increase capacity in existing facilities – while others used the additional funding to 
bolster non-custodial alternatives or re-entry support services (Schlanger, 2013). In Santa Clara 
County, specifically, there was a steady increase in the amount of county funding that the Santa 
Clara County Department of Corrections received from 2012 through 2019. Figure B is a chart 





Figure B: Santa Clara County Budget: Department of Corrections (2010-2019) 
 
Source: (County of Santa Clara, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). 
 Santa Clara County spending on corrections decreased significantly immediately after 
AB 109 was implemented, and there was a steady yearly increase thereafter. The money 
allocated to corrections is a significant part of state and county budgets and must be considered 
when it comes to creating, proposing, and implementing realignment strategies.   
Proposition 47 
California is unique in that its residents can be involved in the policymaking process through 
direct democracy, which has been called the “political bedrock” of the state (Gerston, 2012, p. 
244). One of the ways in which direct democracy functions is through the ballot initiative 
process. During this process, an initiative is drafted and proposed to voters in the hopes that 
enough of them will sign a petition to qualify the initiative to appear on the ballot for the next 





came to be. Proposition 47 was actually proposed by William Lansdowne - Chief of the San 
Diego Police Department - and George Gascon - the District Attorney for the City of San 
Francisco (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). 
Proposition 47 went into effect on November 5th, 2014, after receiving approximately 
60% of the vote (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018; Dooley-Sammuli, 2015; JCC, 2016; Males, 2016; 
Naimo, 2016). Proposition 47 was ultimately codified in the California Penal Code as section 
1170.18 (California Legislative Information [CLI], n.d.a.). The measure was a type of sentencing 
reform that implemented a reduction of penalties for certain nonviolent crimes, drug offenses, 
and “low-level” misdemeanors, and allowed for the reclassification of certain prior convictions 
(Dooley-Sammuli, 2015; LAO, 2015a; Males, 2016; Naimo, 2016). It also allowed incarcerated 
individuals serving sentences for Proposition 47 eligible offenses to petition for resentencing 
(Males, 2016; Naimo, 2016). Further, it required that any cost savings resulting from its 
implementation be invested in education, treatment and diversion programs (LAO, 2015a). The 
following sections provide information on the content of Proposition 47, how it functions, its 
implementation, its impact on criminal justice agencies and on crime trends. 
When Proposition 47 was first proposed, those who argued against it believed that the 
measure would release a significant number of dangerous criminals into society all at once 
(Males, 2016). Opponents also believed that reducing penalties for certain crimes would reduce 
the deterrence factor provided by strict sentences and incarceration, and would cause a decrease 
in public safety by encouraging more crime (Males, 2016; Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018). Those in 
favor of the measure argued that Proposition 47 would reduce state spending on corrections and 
would require cost savings be invested in programs which aimed to reduce recidivism and 





Union argued that Proposition 47 allowed the government to hold offenders accountable without 
having to resort to incarceration (Dooley-Sammuli 2015). Dooley-Sammuli (2015) stated that 
Proposition 47 reduced criminal penalties that were “overly harsh,” thereby ensuring that 
individuals did not receive long sentences for petty crimes, and were not ultimately affected by 
the stigma of being a convicted felon. 
Purpose 
 
The overarching purpose of Proposition 47 was to reduce state spending on corrections and 
distribute the savings among community organizations whose goal it was to prevent crime, 
reduce recidivism and provide resources to both victims and offenders (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). 
Section two of the Proposition 47 measure initiative reads as follows: 
The People enact the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act to ensure that prison spending 
is focused on violent and serious offenses, maximize alternatives for non- serious, 
nonviolent crime, and invest the savings generated from this Act into prevention and 
support programs in K-12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment. 
This Act ensures that sentences for people convicted of dangerous crimes like rape, 
murder, and child molestation are not changed (OAG, 2013, p. 3). 
The full text of the ballot initiative indicated that Proposition 47 would save the state between 
$150 and $200 million annually (OAG, 2013). It required these cost savings to be re-distributed 
into the community in a specific way in order to “reduce crime and improve public safety” 
(OAG, 2013, p. 4). It also ensured that individuals who were convicted of serious crimes would 
not be eligible for relief under the measure (OAG, 2013). 






The intent of Proposition 47 was to reduce the amount of time individuals were incarcerated for 
offenses deemed to be non-violent and non-serious (OAG, 2013). It specifically affected six 
crimes: drug possession, receiving stolen property, theft, shoplifting, writing bad checks, and 
forgery (OAG, 2013; Bird et al., 2016). Table 3 summarizes how these statutes were affected. 
Table 3: Proposition 47 Offenses 
Crime Before Proposition 47 After Proposition 47 
Drug possession “Wobbler” depending on the 
amount and type of drug. 




If property valued at under $400 it 
is a misdemeanor, if over $400 it is 
a felony. 
If property valued at under $950 it is a 
misdemeanor, if over $950 it is a 
felony. 
Theft If property valued under $400 it is 
a misdemeanor, if over $400, it is 
a felony. 
If property valued under $950 it is a 
misdemeanor, if over $950, it is a 
felony. 
Shoplifting “Wobbler” depending on the value 
of the property. May be charged as 
a burglary. 
Misdemeanor if property is valued at 
less than $950. Cannot be charged 
with both shoplifting and burglary. 
Writing bad checks Misdemeanor if less than $450, if 
over $450 it is a felony. If suspect 
has prior convictions for a forgery-
related crime, can be charged as a 
felony. 
Misdemeanor if less than $950. If 
offender has 3 or more forgery-related 
convictions, may be charged as a 
felony. 
Forgery “Wobbler” regardless of the 
amount. 
Misdemeanor if less than $950. If 
done in conjunction with identity 
theft, it is a felony. 
Source: (Bird et al., 2016; Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018; Couzens, 2016; LAO, 2015a). 
Prior to Proposition 47, offenses like drug possession, shoplifting and forgery were 
considered “wobblers,” meaning that they could be charged as a misdemeanor or a felony (Bird 
et al., 2016). Proposition 47 also increased the minimum monetary thresholds for the financial 
and property-related crimes listed in Table 3 (Bird et al., 2016; Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). Some of 
these crimes remained “wobblers” if an offender had certain prior criminal convictions (Bird et 
al., 2016). Proposition 47 also created a criminal statue specific to shoplifting, Section 459.5 of 





stolen property was under $950 (Alameda County District Attorney’s Office [ALCODA], 2014; 
CLI, n.d.b.).  
 Proposition 47 became effective immediately after it was passed. This meant that any 
individuals arrested for the aforementioned crimes after November 5th, 2014 were automatically 
eligible to be charged according to the new Proposition 47 guidelines. For example, an individual 
who stole $900 worth of cosmetics from a specialty store and was immediately apprehended 
outside the store by local law enforcement could be arrested for misdemeanor shoplifting. Given 
that these were new offenses that had just occurred, this change was not expected to create any 
additional workload. Cases that were still being processed could request to have their offense 
reclassified during routine court proceedings (Naimo, 2016). 
Disqualifying Offenses 
Not all offenders qualified for resentencing or reclassification under Proposition 47. The stated 
purpose of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act was that no offenders who had been 
convicted of a dangerous crime could have their sentences reduced or criminal records amended 
as a result of this act (OAG, 2013). Individuals with a least one prior conviction for any of the 
offenses enumerated under California Penal Code Section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or sex offenses 
requiring sex offender registration per California Penal Code Section 290(c) were deemed 
ineligible for relief under Proposition 47 (Couzens, 2016). Individuals who were convicted of 
any of these offenses in another state or of certain crimes as a juvenile would also be deemed 
ineligible for Proposition 47 relief (Couzens, 2016). Table 4 lists the aforementioned 





Table 4: Proposition 47 Disqualifying Offenses 
A “sexually violent offense” 
 
Welfare and Institutions Code  
Section 6600(b)  
Oral copulation with a child under 14 Penal Code Section 288a  
Sodomy with a child under 14 Penal Code Section 286  
Sexual penetration with a child under 14 
 Penal Code Section 289 
A lewd or lascivious act involving a child  
under 14 years of age Penal Code Section 288 
Homicide (including attempted homicide) Penal Code Section 187 through 191.5 
Solicitation to commit murder Penal Code Section 653f 
Assault with a machine gun on a peace officer  
or firefighter Penal Code Section 245 
Possession of a weapon of mass destruction Penal Code Section 11418(1)(a) 
Serious or violent felonies punishable  
in California by life imprisonment or death Vary 
 
Source: (CLI, n.d.c.) 
A final consideration when determining whether or not an offender is eligible for relief 
under Proposition 47 is the court’s ability to decide whether he or she poses an “unreasonable 
risk of danger to public safety” (Couzens, 2016, p. 6). California Penal Code section 1170.18(c) 
states that this is the case if there is a high likelihood that the offender would commit a new 
violent felony like those listed in Table 4 (CLI, n.d.a.). In applying this test, the court can 
consider an individual’s complete criminal history, his or her records while in custody, and any 
other evidence it finds relevant. However, this test can only be applied for resentencing petitions, 
not reclassification applications. (Couzens, 2016). 






Proposition 47 was written in a way that allowed it to be applied retroactively. It created two 
options for relief: a petition for resentencing or an application for reclassification (OAG, 2013; 
Naimo, 2016). A person who was in custody for an offense that was affected by Proposition 47 
could petition for resentencing (OAG, 2013). This meant that their case would be reviewed, and 
their felony conviction for a Proposition 47 offense could be changed to a misdemeanor 
(Couzens, 2016). The judge who originally sentenced the individual could then adjust the 
sentence accordingly (Couzens, 2016).  Proposition 47 did impose a few limitations on how the 
court decides to resentence an individual. The individual must get credit for the time that they 
have already served, the new sentence cannot be longer than the previous one, and a resentenced 
offender must be placed under community supervision (parole) for at least a year unless the court 
specifically waives this requirement (Couzens, 2016; LAO, 2015a). 
A person who had already served a sentence for a qualifying offense could apply to have 
the conviction reclassified from a felony to a misdemeanor (Naimo, 2016). Since the person had 
already completed the sentence, the primary benefit of going through this process was removing 
a felony conviction from the criminal record. Proposition 47 does not require a court hearing for 
either the resentencing or reclassification process (Couzens, 2016). Court hearings typically only 
take place when the offender’s eligibility is being contested, or when a victim of a crime has 
requested to be involved in the process. It is interesting to note that a victim of a crime could be 
entitled to attend a Proposition 47 resentencing hearing based on the victim’s rights that are 
protected by Marsy’s law (Couzens, 2016). However, it is not likely that a victim would be 
notified about (or be able to give input during) the reclassification process, since it can be 





Proposition 47 explicitly stated that all petitions and applications must be submitted 
within three years of its implementation, meaning they would only be accepted through 
November of 2017 (LAO, 2015a). In September of 2016, Assembly Bill 2765 (AB 2765) 
amended section 1170.18 of the California Penal Code (the section where Proposition 47 was 
codified) to allow individuals to continue to submit applications or petitions through November 
4th of 2022 (CLI, n.d.a; Couzens, 2016). Although both the text of Proposition 47 and AB 2765 
mention that petitions and applications will be accepted past the final submission deadline upon a 
“showing of good cause,” they do not spell out what would constitute good cause under this 
provision (OAG, 2013, p15).  
Associated Cases 
It was initially believed that Proposition 47 did not apply to juvenile offenders. The text of the 
proposed law and 1170.18 P.C. do not mention juveniles. In July of 2015, the California Fourth 
District Court of Appeal decided the Alejandro N. v. Superior Court of San Diego County case 
(Couzens, 2016; JCC, 2016). In April of 2013, Alejandro N. admitted to committing a 
commercial burglary – a felony (Alejandro N. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 2015). He 
was given a three-year sentence, required to pay a $50 fine, and was also required to provide a 
DNA sample to be entered into the Department of Justice database, a standard practice for felony 
offenders (Alejandro N. v. Superior Court of San Diego Count, 2015). After the passage of 
Proposition 47, Alejandro N. petitioned to have this felony reclassified as a misdemeanor, have 
his sentence reduced, and have his DNA removed from the DOJ DNA database. The Superior 
Court of San Diego County agreed to reduce Alejandro N.’s sentence and release him but refused 
remove his DNA profile from the database. They also refused to reclassify the felony on his 





Code did not apply to juvenile offenders (even though they had accepted and applied Proposition 
47 sentencing standards to his case). 
Alejandro N. appealed this decision. In July of 2015, the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
held that Proposition 47 applied to juveniles because they could not be “physically confined 
longer than an adult offender for the same offense” per Section 726 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code (Alejandro N. v. Superior Court of San Diego County). This case paved the 
way for a wave of juvenile resentencing and reclassification petitions. 
Court officials were also initially working under the impression that Proposition 47 did 
not apply to offenders who had received their sentences as part of a plea bargain (SJAP, 2015). 
The Superior Court of Contra Costa County agreed with this and refused to allow another 
juvenile offender, Tre W., who had received his sentence via plea bargain to obtain relief under 
Proposition 47 (SJAP, 2015). Tre W. robbed a victim of her purse (felony robbery) and was 
found in possession of her property (felony receiving stolen property) in 2010. In April of 2015, 
the First Appellate District Court of California decided the Tre W. v. Superior Court of Contra 
Costa County case (SJAP, 2015). The court held that Tre W. was entitled to relief (SJAP, 2015). 
Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Fund 
The passage of Proposition 47 created the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Fund (SNSF), which 
was codified in the California Government Code under chapter 33 (Division 7 of Title 1) as 
Sections 7599 through 7599.2 (CLI, n.d.d.). The ability to cite and release on misdemeanor 
offenses was expected to result in a decrease in jail bookings and an increase in cost savings 





Proposition 47 specified that the first deposit into the SNSF would take place on August 15th 
of 2016, and would repeat annually (LAO, 2016; OAG, 2013). Proposition 47 indicated that the 
money in this fund was to be distributed as depicted in Table 5. 
Table 5: Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Fund Distribution 
Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Fund Distribution 
65% - Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC) 
25% - California Department of Education (CDE) 
10% - Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (CalVCB) 
 
*up to 5% of these funds may be allocated to administration expenses. 
Source: (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015; OAG, 2013; LAO, 2015a; LAO, 2016). 
Assembly Bill 1056 (A.B. 1056) required the BSCC to distribute the funds via a grant 
process to public agency programs designed to provide people charged or convicted of a crime 
with treatment and other services (LAO, 2016). It also specified that the BSCC should give 
priority to programs that provided mental health services, substance abuse treatment, and 
diversion when awarding grants (Bird et al., 2016; LAO, 2015a; LAO, 2016; OAG, 2013). The 
CDE was expected to use additional funding towards truancy and dropout prevention, but there 
was no specific way the funding was to be disbursed (LAO, 2016). The CalVCB was to 
distribute funds to its trauma recovery centers through the procedure already established (LAO, 
2016). It specified that only up to five percent of the grant funds could be used for operating and 
administrative expenses (OAG, 2013).  
Initial estimates of cost savings   
The text of Proposition 47 did not specify how to calculate cost savings produced by the changes 
it implemented (LAO, 2016). Since it did not specify how to calculate savings, it was difficult to 
determine what amount should be deposited into the SNSF. This notwithstanding, scholars and 
public agencies attempted to estimate the potential cost savings associated with Proposition 47. 





county as a result of Proposition 47. By their estimates, the 58 counties in California would save 
somewhere between $400 and $700 million after Proposition 47 was implemented (Buchen & 
Males, 2014). They specifically estimated that Santa Clara County would save between $9.7 and 
$16.9 million, and that somewhere between 242 and 726 jail beds would become available 
(Buchen & Males, 2014). Ultimately, the state was estimated to have saved over $156 million in 
the 2015-2016 fiscal year due to Proposition 47 (SJAP, 2015). 
In 2015, the LAO estimated that the cost savings that could be attributed to Proposition 47 
would be between $100 million and $200 million. The Governor’s Office worked under the 
assumption that Proposition 47 would result in a reduction of 1,900 inmates for the 2015-2016 
fiscal year (LAO, 2015b). As a result, they proposed a $12.7 million reduction to the CDCR 
budget in order to account for their estimated Proposition 47 savings (LAO, 2015b). In order to 
account for uncertainties in the prison population and availability of new beds, the governors’ 
office increased their CDCR budget proposal slightly to allow for more contract beds and the 
construction of new “infill bed facilities” (LAO, 2015a, p. 10). “Infill bed facilities” are 
additional buildings constructed for the purposed of increasing a correctional facilities’ design 
capacity (LAO, 2015a). The LAO believed that this was ultimately providing the CDCR with 
unnecessary funding, and indicated that they believed that the Governor’s Office was 
underestimating the potential effects of Proposition 47 and overestimating the total inmate 
population for the following year. 
Ultimately, the LAO concluded that it was not possible to make the best decision regarding 
funding without more information (LAO, 2015a). This, however, was to be expected since the 





of a new program, and decision-makers tend to be risk-averse when making decisions that 
impact the budget (M. Record, personal communication, March 23rd, 2020). 
Calculation of cost savings 
The amount deposited into the SNSF is based on the calculated cost savings from the 
previous fiscal year, meaning this amount could vary from year to year (LAO, 2015a). Several 
scholars noted that potential cost savings resulting from Proposition 47 presented themselves as 
work reductions, while other cost savings were simply re-distributed or re-allocated to other 
resources (LAO 2015a; Naimo, 2016; SJAP, 2015). This ultimately reduced the final amount of 
tangible monetary savings LAO 2015a; Naimo, 2016; SJAP, 2015). The actual amount would 
vary according to the number of offenders affected by Proposition 47, the actual prison capacity 
(LAO, 2015a). In their analysis of the fiscal impacts of Proposition 47, the Legislative Analyst’s 
Office (LAO) assumed that the intent of the measure was to avoid any extra cost to the state 
(LAO, 2016). They proposed a specific method of calculating cost savings in order to determine 
the appropriate amount to deposit into the SNSF. Figure C represents this calculation method 





Figure C: Suggested Method for Calculating Savings/SNSF deposit 
 
Source: (LAO, 2016). 
The LAO (2016) indicated that this calculation should be done yearly according to 
Proposition 47 savings in the past year. The total Proposition 47 savings would be determined by 
finding the difference between the total savings and the total cost of implementing the measure 
that year. The affected agency budgets for the following year should then be reduced by this 
amount, and they should be allowed to re-allocate their savings as they deemed most appropriate. 
Finally, the state would deposit an equal amount into the SNSF fund. This would ensure that the 
state did not incur any extra costs since it was reducing agency budgets by the amount that it 
deposited into the SNSF. The LAO (2016) reported that the state administration did not follow 
this model in all cases as they had recommended. 
The state administration estimated that Proposition 47 savings (difference between the total 
savings and the cost to implement Proposition 47) for the 2016-2017 fiscal year were $29.3 





Legislative Analyst’s Office concluded that the administration was underestimating cost savings 
from Proposition 47, and that based on their calculations using this method, the actual amount 
could be $100 million more than the administration estimated (LAO, 2016). 
Lack of consistency in calculating savings and data collection 
A report written by the Auditor-Controller of the County of Los Angeles indicated that several of 
their county departments did not have a way to track expenditures and savings related to the 
implementation of Proposition 47. This included departments such as Police, District Attorney, 
Mental Health, Public Health, and Health Services. The report estimated that the Sherriff’s 
Department, the Department of Mental Health and the Department of Public Health would see a 
potential cost savings of $9.2 million for the 2015-2016 fiscal year. Naimo (2016) indicated that 
the Sherriff’s Department was unable to differentiate between cost savings as a result of 
Proposition 47 and as a result of reducing the correctional population in other ways. Four other 
counties in the immediate area were contacted and none of them had a way to keep track of cost 
savings related specifically to Proposition 47. The American Civil Liberties Union nonprofit 
organization was also contacted and they also indicated that they did not know of any county in 
the state that methodically tracked cost savings related to Proposition 47 (Naimo, 2016). 
Impacts of Proposition 47 
The implementation of Proposition 47 has had significant effects on criminal justice agencies. As 
soon as researchers began trying to measure the impact of Proposition 47 on individual agencies, 
they realized that there was a concern about the reliability of data (Naimo, 2016). Some agencies 
were not tracking Proposition 47 data at all, while others believed that their data was unreliable 





In 2015, the LAO estimated that 40,000 offenders would be affected by the 
implementation of Proposition 47 (LAO, 2015a). The exact number of people who would be 
eligible for reclassification under the proposition was unknown, but it was estimated to be a total 
of over a million people (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). It was also noted that about 80% of cases 
eligible for changes according to Proposition 47 were for drug possession (Dooley-Sammuli, 
2015). 
Courts  
The workload amount and type of work being performed by Courts changed drastically as a 
result of Proposition 47. In order to implement Proposition 47 changes, the court system had to 
create petition/application forms, change their data collection process in order to ensure that 
these new groups were tracked, train employees on new processes, and assign the increased 
workload to existing or supplemental employees (JCC, 2016). New work practices included 
placing Proposition 47 matters on court calendars, notifying correctional facilities of changes to 
inmates’ sentences, arranging inmate transfers or releases, accessing original case files for 
Proposition 47 hearings, as well as processing all new forms and collecting data on the 
population affected by Proposition 47 (JCC, 2016). 
Several unanticipated issues arose after the courts began processing these applications. In 
certain cases, it was difficult to determine the actual value of property in theft-related Proposition 
47 offenses . Courts not only had to handle and hear Proposition 47 matters, they also had to 
handle appeals when these petitions and applications were denied. Courts became responsible for 
notifying the Registrar of Voters when offenders had their felony convictions reclassified to 





It was also difficult to determine how much in-custody time an offender had served when he 
or she had received concurrent sentences for multiple offenses (JCC, 2016). Often, incarcerated 
individuals were serving sentences for multiple offenses. In the case that some of the offenses 
were eligible for resentencing and others were not, the court would take this into account and 
adjust their sentence only according to the offenses that were affected (Couzens, 2016). It was 
also noted that Proposition 47 offenders typically had longer criminal histories, which made their 
cases more complex, so it took court officials longer to arrive at a disposition (JCC, 2016).  
Interviews with judges and courthouse officials revealed several significant trends. It 
appeared that the number of felony–level drug sales and maintaining a drug house (Section 
11366 of the California Health and Safety Code) cases that were filed increased after Proposition 
47, but this observation has not yet been verified through data. Judges believed that there was an 
increase in misdemeanor cases taken to trial because offenders were no longer incentivized to 
accept a plea bargain by the idea of having to spend time in custody. Several courts reported an 
increase in failure to appear (FTA’s) for Proposition 47 misdemeanor arraignments, resulting in 
the need to issue bench warrants. Collaborative courts (drug treatment/diversion court) indicated 
that they received fewer referrals because offenders would not choose to participate in a long 
treatment program when they were essentially guaranteed little to no jail time for the offense 
(JCC, 2016). 
There was also a 15% increase in misdemeanor cases (about 22,000 additional cases) 
filed in court during the first half of 2015 as compared to first half of 2014 (JCC, 2016). This 
statistic represents only 40 counties in California that were able to report complete Proposition 
47- related data (JCC, 2016). Total convictions declined by about 20% between October 2014 





period (Bird et al., 2016). This statistic represents a sample of 13 counties in California (Bird et 
al., 2016). Several other studies also suggested that the number of convictions had decreased 
after Proposition 47 (Bird et al., 2016; Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018; Buchen & Males, 2014; 
LAO, 2015a). 
The fact that Proposition 47 went into effect immediately after it was passed necessarily 
meant that there was a massive influx of applications and petitions for relief under the act (LAO, 
2016). The state provided the court system with $27 million to help with the additional workload 
generated by the influx of Proposition 47 petitions and applications (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015; 
LAO, 2015a). No other agency received additional funding from the state to assist with the 
implementation of Proposition 47. As a result, some counties applied for and received funding 
through grants, while others received funding from the local community corrections fund 
(Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). 
After the initial barrage of submissions, there was a steady decrease in the number of 
petitions for resentencing being filed, as well as a steady increase in the number of applications 
for reclassification being filed between November of 2014 and December of 2015 (Naimo, 
2016). This change was attributed to an increase in the number of offenses being reclassified 
while still in the court process, decreasing the need to file petitions for resentencing (Naimo, 
2016). The petition and application workload decreased as new offenders were classified and 
sentenced according to the new Proposition 47 standards (LAO, 2015a). The increase in the 
filing of applications for reclassification was attributed to an increase of people completing 
sentences, or simply becoming aware that reclassification was an option (Naimo, 2016). While 





fashion, statewide as time went on (LAO, 2015a). Figure D is a chart showing a visual 
representation of the Los Angeles County data referenced by Naimo (2016): 
Figure D: Petitions and Applications Submitted In LA County 
Source: (Naimo, 2016). 
Initial estimates regarding the number of resentencing petitions and reclassification 
applications submitted state-wide varied from 150,00 to over 200,000 (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015; 
JCC, 2016). Table 13 in Appendix A lists the total number petitions and applications submitted 
by county between November of 2014 and September of 2015. Table 13 only includes the 40 
counties studied in the ACLU report (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). According to the Judicial Council 
of California (2019), 1,117 resentencing petitions and 4,585 reclassification applications were 
submitted in Santa Clara County between November of 2014 and September of 2019. All of 
these were associated with adult offenders and represented individual cases, not individual 
offenders (JCC, 2019). This number, along with the totals for other counties in the state, are 





Figure E: Proposition 47 Petitions and Applications Submitted in 12 CA Counties 
(November 2014-September 2019) 
 
Source: (JCC, 2019) 
The total number of petitions/applications for the counties that reported their data to the JCC 
(not all counties reported consistently throughout the years) between November 2014 through 
September of 2019 was 374,782 (JCC, 2019).  Table 14 in Appendix A lists the total number 
petitions and applications submitted by county between November of 2014 and September of 
2019. Since AB 2765 extended the petition/application acceptance period through November 4th 
of 2022, the court system has been expected to continue handling the increased responsibility 
through at least the next two years (Couzens, 2016). Some courts hired new employees to help 
ease the burden of the newly increased workload, while others re-hired retired employees to 
assist (JCC, 2016). Other courts temporarily re-assigned employees to assist with Proposition 47 
cases, causing other court services to suffer (JCC, 2016). 





Due to the fact that Proposition 47 reclassified several felony offenses to misdemeanors, 
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) saw a marked decrease in 
the number of offenders who were eligible to go to prison (LAO, 2016). Offenders who 
committed a new Proposition 47 offense would typically be incarcerated in a county jail, if they 
were incarcerated at all. CDCR experienced a further reduction in their prison population 
because a large group of those individuals who were currently incarcerated suddenly became 
eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47 (LAO, 2016). Some of these offenders were 
released immediately, some served shorter sentences, and others were transferred into the county 
jail system to serve the remainder of their sentences. As a result of the combined effect of these 
factors, there was a significant reduction of the prison population, which reduced the prison 
workload and increased the parole workload (Buchen & Males, 2014; LAO, 2015a). 
Between its enactment and September of the following year, 4,454 state prisoners were 
determined to be eligible for relief under the act and were ultimately released (SJAP, 2015). It 
should be noted that approximately 159 of these individuals were later re-incarcerated for new 
crimes (SJAP, 2015). Within a year of the implementation of Proposition 47, the prison 
population decreased by about 6%, which was enough to fall below the population caps imposed 
by the courts in February of 2015 (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018; Lofstrom & Martin, 2015; SJAP, 
2015). California’s incarceration rate dropped to about 538 for every 100,000 residents, the 
lowest it had been in twenty years (Lofstrom & Martin, 2015). In 2015, the LAO reported that it 
expected the state to be able to meet or stay below the population caps imposed by the court as a 
result of Proposition 47. 
On March 16, 2020, the CDCR published its most recent update to the three-judge court 





compliance with the court-imposed population caps for the past five years, and that as of March 
11th, 2020, the total population is actually at 134.4% of design capacity (CDCR, 2020b).  
Sheriff departments and jail populations 
Although no additional funding was given to law enforcement agencies across the state to help 
with the implementation of Proposition 47, sheriff’s departments and probation departments took 
it upon themselves to make offenders aware of their potential rights for relief under Proposition 
47 (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). This is likely due to the fact that sheriff’s departments oversee the 
county jail system and have the most direct access to eligible offenders.  
Proposition 47 led to fewer bookings into county jails, fewer convictions, more pretrial 
releases, and a reduction in the average length of time served by inmates (Bird et al., 2016; 
Buchen & Males, 2014; LAO, 2015a). On average, offenders served about 25 days less than they 
did before Proposition 47 was implemented (Bird et al., 2016). Overall, County jail populations 
in California decreased between 9% and 13% in the year after Proposition 47 was passed (Bird et 
al., 2016; Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018; Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). Pretrial releases increased from 
32% to 37% in the same time period (Bird et al., 2016).  
It has been estimated that there has been a 50% decline in the number of people incarcerated 
for Proposition 47 offenses and the number of new bookings for Proposition 47 offenses 
decreased by about 56% (Bird et al., 2016). There was approximately a 68% reduction in 
individuals booked on drug possession charges in the year after Proposition 47 (Bird et al., 
2016).  
Sheriff’s departments’ cost savings manifest themselves in the form of lowered operating 
costs related to food, health services, laundry and other inmate housing supplies. There were 





members, regardless of the number of inmates. While Proposition 47 did result in some people 
being released from incarceration, their beds were ultimately occupied by inmates who had been 
slated for an early release due to the overcrowded conditions (Naimo, 2016).  
The practice of releasing an inmate who is serving a sentence for the purpose of reducing 
overcrowding is called a “capacity release” (Bird et al., 2016). This kind of release decreased by 
approximately 65% after the passage of Proposition 47 (Bird et al., 2016; Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 
2018). While Proposition 47 resulted in shortened sentences and an increase of releases from jail 
for Proposition 47 offenses, the jail population was not expected to change much due to jails 
deciding to stop “capacity releases” (LAO, 2015a). County jails used the beds made suddenly 
available by Proposition 47 to house other (non-Proposition 47) inmates that would have 
qualified for a “capacity release” (Bird et al., 2016). This practice resulted in slightly less 
significant fluctuations in jail populations overall after the implementation of Proposition 47 
(LAO, 2015a). 
Specifically, although the LA County Sheriff’s Department expected a workload 
reduction associated with Proposition 47, they found themselves dedicating more resources to 
the remaining inmate population for mental health treatment.  They experienced a growth in the 
population of inmates who required mental health treatment. Since these inmates are typically 
housed on their own due to safety concerns, they also took up more of the newly available bed 
space (Naimo, 2016) 
In 2015, the LAO mentioned that Proposition 47 data specific to AB 109 offenders was 
unavailable, but is likely to be significant because felony offenders that had been “realigned” 
(currently supervised at the county level instead of state level for “non-non-non” felony offenses 





biggest impact of Proposition 47 would be in the reduction of time these offenders would serve 
(LAO, 2015a). 
Public and mental health agencies 
County departments responsible for public health and mental health are primarily 
responsible for providing inmates in county jails with clinical and treatment-related services. 
Their cost savings are a result of having to provide fewer services, due to a decrease in the 
number of incarcerated people that require resources and treatment (Naimo, 2016). The 
Department of State Hospitals saw a decrease in the number of people being committed into 
mental institutions (LAO, 2016). This decrease was attributed to the fact that there were fewer 
felony cases in court (as a result of Proposition 47), which resulted in fewer people being 
committed after being declared incompetent to stand trial (LAO, 2016). 
Probation 
The LA County probation department expected a workload reduction due to there being fewer 
people on probation (Naimo, 2016). Since Proposition 47 offenders weren’t sentenced to strict 
community supervision like other felony offenders, this was also expected to result in a workload 
reduction (LAO, 2015a). However, in LA, Proposition 47 cost savings were re-allocated towards 
homelessness, mental health and diversion programs, so their overall workload did not decrease, 
(Naimo, 2016). 
Local law enforcement agencies 
In 2015, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) published a report reviewing the first year 
of Proposition 47’s implementation. In their discussion of challenges in implementing 
Proposition 47, the ACLU indicated that there was initially some resistance from law 





justice reform would result in an increase in crime rates as a result of the increase in offenders 
being released (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015; Nguyen, 2015). 
In general, local law enforcement agencies arrested fewer people for Proposition 47 offenses 
after its implementation (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018; JCC, 2016). In a sample of 13 California 
counties, the percentage of people cited and released after arrest increased from 6% in October 
2014 to 19% in October of 2015 (Bird et al., 2016). The average number of arrests made per 
month decreased by about 5% in the year after Proposition 47 was implemented as compared to 
the year before (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018).  
Another study using a sample of 12 California counties revealed that the average number of 
cite and release arrests increased by about 8% in the year after Proposition 47 was implemented. 
This data was interpreted to mean that not only was law enforcement making fewer arrests for 
these kinds of criminal offenses, but they also booked less of these offenders than they had in the 
past. The study showed jail bookings declined by about 8% in the year after Proposition 47, 
dropping to 55,400 from 60,000 the year before. They noted that individuals of Caucasian or 
Latino descent were booked less often than African Americans. The number of African 
Americans booked into jail actually increased by 0.7% in the year after Proposition 47 was 
implemented (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018). 
State 
In regards to the distribution of the SNSF, the State Controller and Finance Department are 
responsible for conducting audits on each grant recipient every two years to ensure that grant 
funds are being spent appropriately (OAG, 2013). This is a significant increase to their typical 
workload, given that the BSCC has awarded 46 grants since the inception of the SNSF. The CDE 





that any additional expenses this created for the state could be withdrawn from the SNSF itself 
(OAG, 2013). 
Community 
The Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC) provides three-year grants from the 
SNSF fund to community-based programs whose purpose it is to provide services to “individuals 
involved in the criminal justice system” (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018, p.19). Grants are awarded 
to organizations and programs that provide treatment, housing support, and mental health 
services. A review of the documents listing the project descriptions of grant recipient programs 
showed that most of these programs provided some combination of substance abuse treatment, 
mental health services, housing support, reentry services, trauma treatment, vocational support, 
intervention or diversion programs, case management, peer counseling, and even utility payment 
assistance (BSCC, 2019a; BSCC, 2019b). These programs typically take a cross-sector 
collaboration approach to assisting recently released individuals (Worth, 2018).  
Typically, these programs submit an application and a proposal to the BSCC in the hopes of 
receiving one of these grants (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018). Grants have been awarded to 
agencies such as the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office, which used the funding to start a drug 
intervention and diversion program (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018). The BSCC awarded grants to 
23 different public agencies for June 2017 through August 2020 (BSCC, 2019a). Since these 
were the first agencies to receive Proposition 47 grant funding, the BSCC refers to them as 
Cohort 1 recipients. These grants totaled $103 million (BSCC, 2019a).  
Due to delays in implementation of their programs, most of these agencies were granted a 
one-year extension through August of 2021. The BSCC awarded grants to 23 public agencies 





grants totaled $96 million (BSCC, 2019b). Outcome evaluations of the grant recipient programs 
are not yet available. Tables 15 and 16 in Appendix B contain a list of public agencies that 
received the grants. 
Crime trends after Proposition 47 
Crime in California rose steadily from the 1960s through 1980s. Crime rates in California have 
been steadily declining over the last four decades (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018). Violent crime 
peaked between 1961 and 1992, declined steadily and began rising again in 2006 (Bird, 
Lofstrom, et al., 2018). Since then it has varied slightly throughout the years, but has generally 
continued to decline (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018). Figure F shows violent and property crime 
rates in California from 1985 through 2018 (the numerical data represented by this figure can be 





Figure F: Property/Violent Crime in the United States and California (1985-2018) 
Source: (RAND Coproration, 2020). 
After both the implementation of AB 109 and Proposition 47, law enforcement officials often 
stated that these criminal justice reforms would result in increased crime rates (Dooley-Sammuli, 
2015; Nguyen, 2015). However, state-wide crime rates fell consistently between the years 2000 
and 2015 (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). 
In January of 2013, the property crime rate in California was the highest it had been in 
seven years. It began to decline steadily and actually reached a point where it was the lowest it 
had been in seven years in November of 2014. Between December of 2014 and January of 2016, 
property crimes increased by about 54,700 crimes total, bringing the property crime rate from 





residents. Bird, Lofstrom, et al. (2018) also found that motor vehicle theft accounted for about 
75% of the additional crimes. In 2015, the Stanford Justice Advocacy Project (SJAP) reported 
that although crimes rose after the implementation of Proposition 47, there was not any data 
showing that the individuals released under Proposition 47 were the ones committing the 
additional crimes (SJAP, 2015).  
The ACLU report indicated that some counties in California did see an increase in crime, but 
that the statewide crime rates did not change significantly. Dooley-Sammuli (2015) found that 
there is likely a difference at the individual agency level as to how they are changing their 
practices in accordance with Proposition 47. She offers the Fresno sheriff’s department and the 
Los Angeles sheriff’s department as examples of this. While the first actually saw a 77% 
increase in arrests for Proposition 47 eligible offenses, the latter only saw a 10% increase. She 
mentions that the sheriff’s department in Sacramento actually experienced a 43% decrease in the 
same type of crime (Dooley-Sammuli, 2015). 
Between January and June of 2015, there was an increase in certain violent crimes and 
property crimes in cities with over 100,000 inhabitants. In a study conducted with a sample of 68 
large California cities, crime data for the first six months of 2015 was compared to that of the 
first six months of 2014. These crime rates were also compared to changes in the overall local 
county jail populations and their specific number of Proposition 47 releases. There was an 
average of an 8% increase in violent crime and a 7% increase in property crime from 2014 to 
2015 in the 68 cities sampled. Males (2016) argued that if Proposition 47 was at fault for the 
increase in crime, then the cities with a higher number of inmate releases would have a larger 





saw a decrease in violent crime and a “smaller increase in property and total crime” (Males, 
2016). 
In looking at the numbers provided in the study, it is apparent that the crime trends vary 
significantly from county to county, as noted by Dooley-Sammuli (2015). For example, San 
Diego county (which included six cities in this study) had a total of 16% decrease in their 
average jail population when comparing March 2014 to March of 2015. This was equivalent to 
an 18% reduction in inmates serving felony sentences. Their violent crime rate increased by 5%, 
but their property crime rate stayed constant during this time period. In Orange county, however, 
there was a 19% decrease in the jail population, which was equivalent to a 25% decrease in 
inmates serving felony sentences. Orange County experienced a 19% increase in violent crime 
and a 25% increase in property crime. For reference, Santa Clara County had a 12% decrease in 
total jail population from this time period, which was equivalent to 20% of inmates serving 
felony sentences. The violent crime rate rose by 3% and the property crime rate rose by 5% 
during this time period (Males, 2016). 
When looking at city-specific data, it is also apparent that crime trends vary significantly 
from city to city. Table 6 shows the change in crime rates (January 2014-June 2014 as compared 





Table 6: Changes In Crime Rates in 10 California Cities (January – June 2014 compared to 
January – June 2015) 
City Property Violent Total 
San Jose 4% 3% 4% 
Santa Clara 12% 3% 11% 
Sunnyvale 7% -1% 6% 
Fremont 3% 24% 4% 
Hayward -3% 1% -2% 
San Francisco 25% 4% 22% 
Salinas -14% 25% -8% 
Stockton -7% 0% -5% 
Modesto 4% 12% 5% 
Los Angeles 13% 23% 15% 
Source: (Males, 2016) 
Males (2016) concluded that although cities with large numbers of Proposition 47 releases 
did experience increases in violent crimes, the actual numbers varied too much to be able to 
prove causation. Males (2016) also noted that the initial increase in crime could be a normal 
spike. A similar increase in crime was seen after the implementation of AB109, but then it 
significantly declined in the following years. Males (2016) stated that it would be beneficial to 
analyze local law enforcement practices over a longer period of time in order to determine the 
actual long term effects of maintaining lower jail populations on crime rates. 
The following year, Males (2017) conducted a study of crime trends in California between 
2010 and 2016. The study revealed that there was less crime during the first six months of 2016 
than there was during the same time period the previous year. Males (2017) explains that 
although the trends were different when looking at the numbers by type of crime, there was a 3% 
decrease in crime overall. There were fewer cases of burglary, theft and arson, but there was an 
increase in vehicle theft cases. There was a total of 7,400 fewer property crimes committed the 
first half of 2016 as compared to the first half of 2015. However, there was also a 4% rise in 





After reviewing seven years of crime trend data, Males (2017) concluded that there was no 
significant change in crime rates after the implementation of AB 109. However, he did indicate 
that it was too soon to see if the same could be said about crime trends after the implementation 
of Proposition 47. Males (2017) also clarified that while he drew these conclusions from 
statewide crime data, crime rates by city did not show the same stability. He indicated that 28 
cities experienced an increase in crime between 2015 and 2016, while 41 actually experienced a 
decrease in total crime (Males, 2017). However, the statistical analysis conducted in this study 
only addressed correlation and was not sufficient to show causation. 
A study conducted by the Public Policy Institute in 2018 also revealed that Proposition 47 
did affect property crime rates. Property crime did increase statewide after the implementation of 
Proposition 47, with larceny thefts increasing by about 9%. The study showed that about 75% of 
this increase was attributed to a rise in thefts from vehicles, specifically (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 
2018).  
Recidivism 
According to the Stanford Justice Advocacy Project, the recidivism rate for offenders 
released under Proposition 47 was less than 5% in October of 2015 (SJAP, 2015). Recidivism 
rates decreased after Proposition 47 was implemented (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018). In studying 
data from a sample of twelve counties in California, only 70.8% of individuals who were 
released after being incarcerated for a Proposition 47 offense were re-arrested within two years, 
as opposed to 72.6% of people who served sentences for similar crimes before Proposition 47 
(Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018).  
Before Proposition 47 was implemented, approximately 45.3% of individuals released after 





kind of offense. After Proposition 47 was implemented, only 35% were rearrested for the same 
kind of offenses. However, due to data limitations, Bird, Lofstrom et al. (2018) were unable to 
make sure they were only analyzing Proposition 47 offenders. Due to the way the data was 
compiled in the counties that were included, it is possible that other felony offenders were 
inadvertently included in their analysis (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018). 
Only 46% of the same population were convicted of new offenses within two years, as 
opposed to 49.1% of people who served sentences for similar crimes before Proposition 47. The 
results of this study suggested that law enforcement made less Proposition 47 arrests and district 
attorneys prosecuted less Proposition 47 crimes, but could not distinguish between Proposition 
47’s effects on reoffending and revised criminal justice agency practices. Changes in re-arrest 
and reconviction rates could also be attributed to offenders changing their patterns of behavior, 
as well as changes in the way criminal justice agencies operate (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018).  
Other California criminal justice reforms 
SB 678 
When SCOTUS upheld the decision to reduce the prison population in California, the population 
had already decreased slightly due to Senate Bill 678 (SB 678) but prisons were still operating at 
approximately 179.5% of their design capacity (Lofstrom & Martin, 2015). SB 678, also known 
as the California Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009, provided 
additional funding to county probation departments that were able to reduce their probation 
failure rate (Judicial Council of California [JCC], 2020). Reducing the probation failure rate 
meant that fewer offenders were re-incarcerated in state prisons as a result of violating the terms 





2015). In the first year after SB 678 was implemented, the prison population decreased by 6,008 
inmates, but prisons were still operating over their design capacity (JCC, 2020a). 
Proposition 36 
Proposition 36 (Prop 36) also had an impact on the state prison population. Passed in November 
of 2012 (just over a year after AB 109, and two years prior to Proposition 47), it made changes to 
California’s infamous three-strikes law (Lofstrom & Martin, 2015; SJAP, 2015). Prop 36 
changed the law so that an offender was only eligible to receive a “third-strike” if the new 
offense was serious or violent (JCC, 2020b). It also applied retroactively, and allowed 
incarcerated “third-strike” offenders to petition for resentencing if their third offense was not 
deemed to be serious or violent (JCC, 2020b). This sentencing reform resulted in a reduction of 
state prison populations, as fewer offenders were being given “third-strike” sentences (Lofstrom 
& Martin, 2015). 
While the combined effect of AB 109, SB 678, and Proposition 36 served to significantly 
decrease prison population levels, it did not decrease them enough to meet the standards set by 
the panel of California judges in 2009 and affirmed by the SCOTUS in 2011 (Lofstrom & 
Martin, 2015; (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018). Those population reduction goals were not met until 
after Proposition 47 was passed (Lofstrom & Martin, 2015; (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018).  
Proposition 57 
Proposition 57 (Prop 57) has also played a role in California’s criminal justice reform movement. 
Prop 57 became effective in November of 2016 (two years after Proposition 47). The public 
safety section of the 2017 California Governor’s Budget Summary states that Prop 57 was 
specifically created in order to ensure that California prisons would continue to comply with the 





accomplish this by allowing offenders convicted of non-violent crimes to be considered for an 
early parole release upon completion of the sentence for their primary offense in prison if they 
could show they were no longer a threat to public safety (CDCR, 2017). It also allowed the 
CDCR to give offenders credits for good behavior and other achievements, and gave judges 
discretion to determine whether specific juvenile cases should be under the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile or adult court (CDCR, 2017). All inmates have the opportunity to earn credits towards 
an early release, with the exception of condemned inmates or those sentenced to life without 
parole (OIG, 2018). By increasing the number of nonviolent offenders who could be considered 
for parole, the number of offenders released would increase, further reducing the total population 
(OIG, 2018). 
The budget summary stated that Prop 57 was expected to result in a 2,000 inmate 
reduction by 2018 and approximately 9,500 by 2021 (CDCR, 2017). Due to this reduction, the 
state also expected to not need out-of-state housing for California prisoners by 2020 (CDCR, 
2017).	Between July of 2017 and April of 2019, 11,245 offenders were referred to the Parole 
Board (OIG, 2019). As of April 2019, 9,194 of these referrals were reviewed, with 1,882 
approved and 3,243 denied (OIG, 2019).	By April 2019, 1490 inmates had earned credits, 
earning an average of 127.9 days of additional credit toward early release (OIG, 2019). 	
City of Campbell 
Campbell is a small city in Santa Clara County. Spanning just over six square miles, it is home to 
approximately 43,250 residents (City of Campbell [COC], 2019). The city of Campbell is 
bordered by the city of San Jose, the town of Los Gatos and the city of Saratoga. In 2019, the 
average family income in Campbell was over $155,000 and the average price for a single family 





obtained their bachelors’ degree or higher (COC, 2019). Figure G shows the population of the 
City of Campbell by race and ethnicity. It should be noted that the figures are estimates and that 
some residents may have been included in multiple categories.  
Figure G: City of Campbell Population by Race and Ethnicity 
 
Source: Data derived from United States Census Bureau (2019). 
The Campbell Police Department provides all law enforcement services within the city. 
The Campbell Police Department had approximately 70 full-time employees at the time of this 
project. Forty of these were sworn full-time peace officers, 11 were reserve officers, and the rest 
worked in the communications unit, the records unit, and the property and evidence unit. The 
department consists of three main divisions: field services, special enforcement, and support 
services. The field services division conducts patrol operations within the city, 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week. Approximately 23 officers (including supervisors) staff four separate patrol shifts: a 





day and night shift during the late half of the week (Wednesday through Saturday). The teams 
work twelve hour shifts and alternate working every other Wednesday. Each officer on each 
team is assigned to his or her own area of responsibility, called a “beat,” within the city. They are 
responsible for responding to calls for service which originate in their area, as well as for 
patrolling the area and enforcing laws in a proactive manner when no calls for service are 
pending.   
The remaining sworn officers either serve in an administrative capacity or are in the 
special enforcement division. The administrative positions include Chief of Police, captain of the 
field services division and captain of the special enforcement division. The special enforcement 
division is comprised of eight investigators (including a supervisor). Two of the investigators 
serve on countywide special enforcement task forces. The other investigators are responsible for 
investigating arson, robbery, homicide, financial crimes, sexual assaults and juvenile crimes. The 
support services division is comprised of 15 dispatchers (including a supervisor), and 10 records 
specialists (including a property and evidence technician, a court liaison and a supervisor). The 
records specialists are primarily responsible for the collection and maintenance of department 
data.   
A resident satisfaction survey conducted in 2015 revealed that 94.5% of all residents 
were either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the quality of life in the city of Campbell. 
81.4% of residents were either very or somewhat satisfied with the way police services were 
being provided by the city. Of the remaining 18.6%, 6% were somewhat dissatisfied, 11.7% 
were not sure, and only 0.9% were very dissatisfied. The resident satisfaction survey included 
questions regarding the resident’s assessment of safety and crime within the city. 98.4% of 





76% felt the same during nighttime hours. 99.1% felt safe walking alone in the downtown area 
during the day, while 89.2% felt the same about walking alone downtown at night (COC, 2016).  
This survey provided some interesting information about the perception of crime levels at 
the local level. The last question in the safety and crime portion of the survey asked, “In general, 
do you feel crime in the City of Campbell has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same in 
the past five years?” Since this survey was conducted in December of 2015, this question was 
specifically asking about the residents perceived changes in crime levels between 2010 and 2015.  
Since Proposition 47 was passed in November of 2014, it had been in place for just over a year at 
the time of the survey. Of those who responded to the survey, 35.2% felt that crime in the City of 
Campbell had increased over the last five years. 41.3% felt the level of crime had stayed about 
the same, 20.4% were unsure, and only 3.1% felt that crime had decreased in the last five years 








A process evaluation was used to determine whether Proposition 47 had been implemented in a 
way that was consistent with its stated purpose over the last six years. According to Sylvia & 
Sylvia (2012), a process evaluation consists of four phases: problem identification, solution 
development, implementation and feedback evaluation.  
Problem identification phase 
The problem in this research was identified through a review of the text of the Safe 
Neighborhoods and Schools Act, otherwise known as Proposition 47. The text of the proposed 
law explicitly stated that its purpose was to ensure that corrections spending “is focused on 
violent and serious offenses,” to “maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime,” and 
to “invest the savings generated from this act into prevention and support programs” (OAG, 
2013). Therefore, the text of the proposed law implied that the problem was an inefficient use of 
monetary resources and a lack of support for offenders.  
The underlying problem was California’s inability to meet prison population caps affirmed 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Plata v. Brown (2011). These population caps are 
an example of an “engineered standard” as described by Sylvia and Sylvia (2012). There were no 
nationwide (or even statewide) population standards for overcrowded prisons and jails before 
SCOTUS affirmed the population caps as set by a panel of California judges. These standards 
represented their expectations (as the decision-makers) regarding the time frame in which 
overcrowding needed to be addressed. This panel of judges engineered the specific population 
caps in an attempt to solve a serious issue which arose in the California criminal justice system.  





The solution to this problem was authored by prominent criminal justice officials and was 
proposed to the residents of California through the ballot initiative process as Proposition 47. 
The solution, as proposed by this measure, involved reducing the amount of money being spent 
on low-level nonviolent offenders and redirecting the savings to community programs designed 
to reduce recidivism. This was expected to result in a reduction of the prison population, cost 
savings to the state and local agencies, and an increased investment in community organizations 
for the purpose of reducing crime and recidivism in the long run. 
Implementation phase 
 The initiative passed and was enacted the following day. Criminal justice agencies 
quickly adjusted their practices and stepped into their new responsibilities under the act. 
Proposition 47 has been in effect since 2014. California now has five complete years of 
Proposition 47 implementation data to review and analyze. Given the nature of the original 
problem, the measures used to evaluate program effectiveness were data regarding the number of 
arrests and jail bookings, total prison and jail population, corrections spending levels, crime rate 
trends, and recidivism rates. Available department-specific arrest, jail bookings, and crime rate 
trend data were also used to assess the impact of Proposition 47 on a local law enforcement 
agency, the Campbell Police Department. 
Feedback evaluation phase 
 This process evaluation also used evaluative criteria and concepts for policy analysis as 
presented by Bardach and Patashnik (2020). Figure H illustrates the four phases of the process 
evaluation of Proposition 47 in the first five years of its implementation in California, following 






Figure H: Process evaluation of Proposition 47 
 
Data Collection 
The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program maintains crime data from over 18,000 
law enforcement agencies around the country (FBI, n.d.a.). Individual agencies voluntarily report 
this data to the UCR program, which then compiles it. Criminal offenses are sorted and compiled 
according to two categories: part I and part II offenses. Part I crimes include homicide, 
manslaughter, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson (FBI, 2010). 
Data about these specific offenses is collected “because they are serious crimes, they occur with 





The UCR program only compiles arrest data from law enforcement agencies for part II 
offenses (FBI, 2010). This means that law enforcement agencies only report the number of 
offenses that were reported, investigated and ultimately resulted in an arrest. The data is 
therefore not representative of all part II offenses which were reported in a given jurisdiction. 
Part II offenses include simple assault, forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, embezzlement, stolen 
property, vandalism, weapons, prostitution and commercialized vice, sex offenses, drug abuse 
violations, gambling, offenses against the family and children, driving under the influence, liquor 
laws, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, suspicion, curfew and loitering, suspicion and 
all other offenses (FBI, 2010). A brief definition of each of these offenses can be found in 
Appendix B. 
 The data in this project that are specific to the Campbell Police Department (CPD) were 
collected and compiled yearly by records specialist personnel in the Support Services Division of 
the police department. The data itself consists of public information regarding crime statistics 
within the City of Campbell. Scanned copies of the yearly summarized data from 2005 to 2017 
were obtained from the shared portion of the police department’s computer network. This portion 
of the network is available to all police department employees. The yearly summarized data for 
2018 and 2019 were not on the shared portion of the network. Records personnel assisted the 
author in locating a hard copy of the 2019 summarized data, and in printing a copy of the 2018 
summarized data from the records division database. This database can only be accessed by 
records personnel. Given that all of the data obtained was saved as a scanned file or printed as a 
hard copy, the data was re-entered for the purposes of this project.  
CPD records personnel collect and maintain data according to the UCR program 





under Part 2 crimes “as a quality control matter and for the purpose of looking at total assault” 
(CPD, 2019). For the purposes of this project, Part I and Part II crimes were calculated both with 
and without simple assaults, unlike the original data provided. It should also be noted that unlike 
the data reported to the UCR program, which only includes Part II offenses for which an arrest 
was made, the data obtained and used in this project are complete department-specific statistics. 
This means that the data includes all offenses that the department has become aware of and 
recorded within its jurisdiction, regardless of disposition. The data, as compiled by the author, 
can be found in Appendix C (Figure Q through Figure U). 
The process evaluation method also required information about government spending on 
the corrections system, prison population and capacity, crime rates, local jail population, and 
booking practices. This information was obtained through a wide-ranging review of information 
made publically-available on the internet. The California state budgets were accessed on the 
California department of finance website, and the Santa Clara county budgets were accessed 
through the county budget and finance website. Information about statewide crime trends was 
obtained through the crime data explorer tool available on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
website. Information regarding statewide prison population and capacity were partially obtained 
through the RAND Corporation state statistics database and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) 
online corrections statistical analysis tool (BJS, n.d.b.). The rest of the information was obtained 
through reports published by the California Office of the Inspector General, court documents, 
and archived population reports available on the CDCR website. Jail population and booking 
information specific to Santa Clara County was obtained through the Board of State and 













Significant Observation 1: Proposition 47 met its explicitly stated goal to reduce the amount of 
money being spent on offenders that commit non serious and non-violent crimes. 
Over the last five years, Proposition 47 has resulted in fewer arrests, fewer bookings, and 
fewer convictions for Proposition 47 offenses statewide in California (Bird et al., 2016; Buchen 
& Males, 2014; LAO, 2015a). The review of the literature provided evidence that these 
reductions were seen within criminal justice agencies statewide. For reference, this research also 
examined local jail population data from Santa Clara County. Figure I shows the average daily 
population per year for all Santa Clara County correctional facilities between 2002 and 2019. 
These data are compared to the total number of bookings per year for the same time period. 
These data were obtained through the online query tool on the BSCC website.  
Figure I: Santa Clara County Jail Average Daily Population and Total Bookings 
 





According to data from the BSCC, the average daily population in Santa Clara County 
jail facilities climbed steadily from 2002 through 2007, when average daily population reached a 
high of approximately 4,598. It then declined steadily through 2011 when the average daily 
population reached 3,538. The average daily population increased steadily between 2011 and 
2014. In 2014, it reached a high of 4,094. This equates to a 15.7% increase in the average daily 
population within the Santa Clara County jail facilities between 2011 and 2014. This increase 
may be attributed to the implementation of AB 109. The transfer of prisoners to county jails and 
the increase in offenders being incarcerated in jails for felony offenses was likely what caused 
this significant increase. However, these data only show correlation and are insufficient to show 
causation.  
This scenario is even more likely when the number of total bookings is taken into 
account. While average daily population increased significantly between 2011 and 2014, the total 
number of bookings between 2011 and 2013 decreased by 11.2%. Total number of bookings 
increased by 23% between 2013 and 2014. The total number of bookings then decreased steadily 
from 2014 through 2018. Between 2014 and 2016, bookings decreased by 8%. Between 2016 
and 2018, they decreased another 22.3%. The total percent change between 2014 and 2018 was 
28.6%.  
The decrease in total bookings (between 2014 and 2018) may be attributed to the 
implementation of Proposition 47 in 2014. The reclassification of certain felonies to 
misdemeanors, increased the number of offenders who could be cited and released, thereby 
decreasing the number of offenders ultimately booked into jail for these offenses. Proposition 47 
also allowed for offenders who were incarcerated to petition for resentencing, leading to their 





than expected. It should be noted that the average daily population also decreased by about 
12.9% between this time period. It is also worth mentioning that while Prop 57 went into effect 
in 2015, it only provided options for early release to offenders incarcerated in prison. It is 
possible that offenders released under Prop 57 may have been subsequently booked for lesser 
offenses into the Santa Clara County Main Jail between 2016 and 2019, however, this population 
was not specifically tracked within the data that was obtained. Again these data do not allow for 
a definitive finding of causation, but do show a strong correlation. 
In 2019, the average daily population in the Santa Clara County jail system was 3,260. 
This is a 24% decrease from 10 years prior in 2009. The total number of bookings did increase 
from 2018 to 2019. There was a 33% decrease in the total number of bookings from the peak in 
2007 to 2019. There was a 20% decrease in the total number of bookings between the 
implementation of Proposition 47 and 2019.  
The average cost to house an inmate in prison was estimated to be $81,203 per year 
(LAO, 2019). A 2018 survey of local detention facilities in the state of California revealed it 
costs about $241.12 per day to house an inmate within the Santa Clara County jail system, which 
is approximately $88,008.80 per year (BSCC, 2018a). Tables 7 and 8 provide examples of 
potential savings derived from an inmate population reduction (specifically within the Santa 
Clara County Jail system). While the calculations in Table 7 assume each inmate was only 
housed for one day, in reality a significant number of inmates are housed for extended periods of 
time while awaiting trial, and others are serving multi-year sentences for felony convictions 
within the jail system as a result of AB 109. The calculations in Table 8 show the total cost of 





Table 7: Santa Clara County Jail Potential Savings based on 2014 and 2019 Total Bookings 
Year Daily Cost per inmate Total Bookings Total Cost 
2014 $241.12 49,318 $11,891,556.20 
2019 $241.12 39,399 $9,499,886.88 
  Savings: $2,391,669.32 
Source: (BSCC, n.d.; BSCC, 2018a) 




Daily cost  
per inmate 
Average Daily 
Population Total Cost 
Total Savings as 
compared to the 
year before 
2011 $241.12 3,538 $853,082.56  
2012 $241.12 3,635 $876,471.20 -$23,388.64 
2013 $241.12 3,978 $959,175.36 -$82,704.16 
2014 $241.12 4,094 $987,145.28 -$27,969.92 
2015 $241.12 3,609 $870,202.08 $116,943.20 
2016 $241.12 3,567 $860,075.04 $10,127.04 
2017 $241.12 3,442 $829,935.04 $30,140.00 
2018 $241.12 3,320 $800,518.40 $29, 416.64 
2019 $241.12 3,260 $786,051.20 $14,467.20 
Source: (BSCC, 2018a; BSCC, 2020). 
While there is likely to be some variation in the cost per inmate between these years, as 
well as some adjustments for inflation, these simplistic examples illustrate the cost savings 
associated with reducing the jail population in Santa Clara County. It follows that the same 
concept would apply at the state prison level. The data in Table 8 show that the average daily 
population in the Santa Clara County jail system increased after the implementation of AB 109 
in 2011, resulting in increased expenses. The data in Table 8 also show a significant reduction of 
expenses after the implementation of Proposition 47 in 2014. While these data do not describe 
what the actual cost savings were, they do demonstrate the potential for extensive cost savings.  
This calculation was replicated in some form in correctional facilities, court systems and 





deposit into the SNSF fund. Thus, the amount deposited into the SNSF yearly is an appropriate 
measure by which to determine Proposition 47’s effectiveness in reducing the money spent on 
non-violent offenders and directing those savings elsewhere. These data will be explored in the 
following section. 
Significant Observation 2: Proposition 47 met its explicitly stated goal to invest savings 
generated into community-based treatment and support programs. 
As previously mentioned, the monetary savings from Proposition 47 are transferred into the 
Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Fund (SNSF) pursuant to California Government Code 7599.1 
(CLI, 2014; State of CA, 2015a). The BSCC then transfers 25% of this amount to the 
Department of Education and 10% to the California Victim Compensation Board. The remaining 
65% of Proposition 47 funds (which were initially deposited into the SNSF) are transferred to 
another fund, called the “Second Chance Fund (SCF),” which is also administered by the BSCC. 
The SCF was created in October of 2015, by A.B. 1056 for the purpose of directing how 
Proposition 47 savings are allocated. The SCF is also referred to as fund 3287, and was codified 
in Section 6046.2(a) of the California Penal Code (State of CA, 2015c).  
A.B. 1056 required the BSCC to use the Proposition 47 funds it received to administer a 
grant program aimed specifically at reducing recidivism (CLI, 2015). These programs target 
individuals who have been convicted of criminal offenses. The services they provide include 
drug treatment and mental health services, housing support, medical care, and assistance in 
complying with court and community supervision requirements (Bird, Lofstrom et al., 2018). 
These programs provide the same type of services that AB 109 anti-recidivism programs do, as 





individuals in the criminal justice system the opportunity to succeed. Table 9 shows the amount 
of money that has been deposited into the SNSF and SCF during the last several fiscal years: 




transfer to SNSF 





Second Chance Fund 
(PC § 6046.2(a)) 
2016-17 $39,449,000 $9,465,000 (24%) $3,945,000 (10%) $25,642,000 (65%) 
2017-18 $45,573,000 $11,296,000 (24.8%) $4,518,000 (9.9%) $29,370,000 (64.4%) 
2018-19 $64,647,000 $16,066,000 (24.9%) $6,426,000 (9.9%) $41,772,000 (64.6%) 
2019-20 $78,444,000 $19,515,000 (24.9%) $7,806,000 (10%) $50,740,000 (65%) 
2020-21 $122,465,000 $30,445,000 (24.9%) $12,178,000 (9.9%) $79,156,000 (64.6%) 
Source: (State of CA, 2018, 2019, 2020b).  
The remaining funds during the last four fiscal years (less than 1%) were allocated to the 
state controller or other administrative expenditures. Over $228 million have been deposited into 
the SNSF as a result of Proposition 47 thus far. If the Governor’s proposed budget for 2020-2021 
were to be enacted, the total amount of money deposited into the Safe Schools and 
Neighborhoods Fund would be over $350 million. The BSCC has used Proposition 47 funds to 
award grants to trauma-informed, evidence-based community programs. These programs provide 
emergency housing support, mental health and drug treatment, counseling, education and 
employment assistance. Tables 15 and 16 in Appendix A list all BSCC grant recipients and 
amounts thus far. 
The California Department of Education (CDE) created the Learning Communities for 
School Success Program (LCSSP) to administer a grant program with the funds received as a 
result of Proposition 47 (California Department of Education [CDE], 2018a). The LCSSP sought 
to award grants to programs that aimed to reduce truancy and support at-risk students (CDE, 
2018a). The CDE awarded $19,079,184 in grants to 20 recipient programs between 2016 and 





grant, which provides funding of $50 per year per enrolled student for the duration of the grant, 
with a maximum of $2,000,000 (CDE, 2018b). The CDE prioritizes local educational agencies 
with increased absenteeism, suspension, and dropout rates, that are located in communities 
where the crime rate exceeds the state-wide average (CDE, 2019a) These programs provide 
various services including in-school non-punitive behavior intervention, social-emotional 
learning activities, and attendance management software. All grant-funded programs must aim to 
increase attendance and decrease student involvement with the criminal justice system, the 
rationale being that if students complete their schooling and stay out of trouble, they are less 
likely to engage in criminal activity in the future. 
A recent audit conducted by the State Controller’s Office verified that all of the CDE’s 
administrative costs were within the 5% maximum as specified in Proposition 47 (Yee, 2019a). 
However, the audit revealed that the Department of Education inaccurately charged 
administrative costs to the Proposition 47 grant program (Yee, 2019a). The Department of 
Education also failed to adequately monitor and review the expenditures and costs of their grant 
recipients to ensure that grant funds were being used according to the program requirements 
(Yee, 2019a). Tables 17 through 20 in Appendix A list grant recipients and amounts thus far that 
were administered by the CDE. These represent over $97,000,000 worth of Proposition 47 
savings that have been re-invested into the California K-12 education system. 
The California Victim Compensation Board (CalVCB) was directed to administer a grant 
program that awarded Proposition 47 funding to trauma recovery centers (TRC) across the State 
of California. On March 19th, 2020, CalVCB announced that they had awarded $13.5 million to 7 
trauma recovery centers for the 2020-21 fiscal year (Zeagler, 2020). The most recent recipients 





Gardena and San Francisco (Zeagler, 2020). These provide services such as trauma informed 
psychotherapy, clinical case management, victim witness advocacy, rape treatment centers and 
support services for victims of violent crime (Alameda County Family Justice Center, n.d.; 
University of California San Francisco, 2020). 
An audit conducted by the State Controller’s Office revealed that CalVCB did not charge any 
administrative costs to the Proposition 47 grant program, and therefore was well within the 5% 
maximum specified in Proposition 47. However, the audit revealed that CalVCB’s internal 
controls were not sufficient when it came to reviewing and approving grant recipient invoices. 
The State Controller’s Office found that CalVCB had reimbursed $6,341 worth of trauma 
recovery center costs that were incurred prior to the start of the grant program. This meant 
CalVCB had to ask the TRCs to return the money, or find another way to account for the error. 
The audit also revealed that CalVCB reimbursed TRCs for $223,342 worth of expenditures that 
had not been adequately documented, reviewed and approved. The State Controller’s office 
noted that the Proposition 47 grant program was the first grant program CalVCB had 
administered, and recommended that they improve their review, approval and accounting 
processes as they continued awarding grants (Yee, 2019b). Table 21 in Appendix A lists all grant 
recipients and amounts as of March 19th, 2020 that were administered by the CalVCB. 
It is evident that a large sum of money is being saved and spent for new social service 
initiatives as a result of Proposition 47. There was a 98.8% increase in the amount of money 
deposited in the SNSF between fiscal year 2016-17 and fiscal year 2019-20. If the Governor’s 
recently proposed budget is approved, there will have been a 210% increase between the amount 
of money deposited in the SNSF during the 2020-21 fiscal year as compared to the 2016-17 





If the funds are disbursed appropriately and their final use proves to be effective, there is great 
potential for Proposition 47 to have a significant positive societal impact on recidivism and crime 
prevention.   
Tables 15 through 21 in Appendix A show that the savings generated by Proposition 47 have 
been distributed according to its directives. The programs that ultimately received funding 
appeared to be firmly rooted community organizations striving to improve conditions for at-risk 
youth, victims of crime, and recently released offenders. Based on these observations, the 
research supports an assertion that Proposition 47 met its goal of reducing spending on non-
violent offenders by reducing penalties and incarceration for specified offenses, increasing the 
resources available to offenders for diversion services, and investing in programs that support at-
risk youth and victims of crime.  
The question that remains is, how effective will this increased investment be? This question 
leads into the next significant observation. 
Significant Observation 4: By reclassifying certain felonies as misdemeanors and allowing those 
previously convicted of these reclassified offenses to petition for resentencing or reclassification, 
Proposition 47 met its implicit goal of reducing the California prison population. 
Although not explicitly stated within the text of Proposition 47, one of the main driving 
forces behind the creation of this type of reform was the need to comply with court-mandated 
population caps. The need to reach this specific numeric goal by a certain date is an example of a 
commonly used evaluative criteria referred to as “Hit the Target!” by Bardach and Patashnnik 
(2020). These authors state that the need to meet a goal such as this is “useful for political 
purposes like mobilizing and focusing attention” (p. 33). The concrete target in this case is the 





Table 10 shows the progress CDCR has made gaining and maintaining compliance with this 
court mandate. The table shows the reported total custody population for state and federal 
prisons in California. It also shows the total design capacity and operational capacity if the 
facilities (when available).  Design capacity is defined as “the number of inmates that planners or 
architects intended for a facility” (BJS, n.d.a.; CDCR, 2019). Operational capacity is defined as 
“the number of inmates that can be accommodated based on a facility's staff, existing programs, 
and services” (BJS, n.d.a.). This measure is called “staffed capacity” on CDCR weekly and 
monthly population reports. The table also shows custody population as a percentage of both 














as a percentage of 
designed capacity 
Custody Population 
as a percentage of 
operational capacity 
1997 145,267 76,352 155,276 203.4 106.9% 
1998 154,101 79,875 159,563 199.8 103.5% 
1999 154,467 80,272 152,763 190.3 98.9% 
2000 154,697 80,467 152,859 190 98.8% 
2001 150,536 79,957 149,654 187.2 99.4% 
2002 155,087 80,587 152,225 188.9 98.2% 
2003 157,070 80,487 155,657 193.4 99.1% 
2004 159,948 80,890 158,307 195.7 99.0% 
2005 164,559 87,250 162,545 186.3 98.8% 
2006 168,150 83,551 166,445 199.2 99.0% 
2007 165,464 82,936 162,841 196.3 98.4% 
2008 161,530 84,066 158,931 189.1 98.4% 
2009 157,427 84,056 155,641 185.2 98.9% 
2010 149,624 84,130 146,701 174.7 98.0% 
2011 n/a 84,130 138,274 164.4% - 
2012 n/a 84,130 123,090 146.3% - 
2013 n/a 86,054 122,798 142.7% - 
2014 127,594 87,187 119,071 136.6% 93.3% 
2015 127,482 87,287 116,569 133.5% 91.4% 
2016 126,832 89,763 117,557 131.0% 92.7% 
2017 n/a 85,083 115,229 135.4% - 
2018 n/a 85,083 114,471 134.5% - 
2019 125,575 89,763 117,555 131% 93.6% 
2020 123,895 89,663 116,886 130.4% 94.3% 
Source: (RAND Corporation, 2020; BJS, 2011-2016; Becerra, 2017; OIG, 2018; CDCR, 2020c). 
 
The data for 1997 through 2010 were obtained from the RAND Corporation California state 
prison populations and capacities statistics database. The data for 2011 through 2016 were 
derived from the Bureau of Justice Statistics online database and reflect the total custody 





2017 through 2019. The data for 2017 were derived from documents provided to the three-judge 
court as an update on their progress towards maintaining compliance with the court-ordered 
population cap (Becerra, 2017). The documents referenced a CDCR population report dated 
August 9th, 2017 (Becerra, 2017). This update did not contain operational or staffed capacity 
measures. The data for 2018 was derived from an Office of the Inspector General report 
regarding CDCR’s progress in reducing the prison population (OIG, 2018). The number shown 
for 2018 is the total population documented as of March 14th, 2018. This report also did not 
contain operation or staffed capacity measures.  
The data for 2019 and 2020 were derived from monthly population reports archived on the 
CDCR website. These reports only included 2019 through March of 2020. This is the reason a 
search of the BJS database, court documents, and OIG reports was required to obtain data for 
2011 through 2018. For the sake of consistency, the numbers shown are the total population 
documented as of March 31st, 2019 and March 31st, 2020 (CDCR, 2020c). 
 As shown in Table 2, the court mandated CDCR to reduce its prison population to 
137.5% of designed capacity by February 27th, 2016. As shown in Table 10, prison population 
had been gradually decreasing since 2006 and continued decreasing with the implementation of 
AB 109 in 2011. California prisons were operating at 164.4% of design capacity in 2011. After 
the implementation of Proposition 47 in 2014, the prisons were operating at 136.6% of design 
capacity, which was below the court-mandated standard. The prison population did not hit this 
concrete target (as described by Bardach and Patashnik, 2020) until Proposition 47 was 
implemented. The CDCR has continued to hit this target every year since the implementation of 





author concluded that Proposition 47 was effective in accomplishing its implicit goal of reducing 
the prison population. 
Significant Observation 5: The implementation of Proposition 47 resulted in a documented 
increase in certain crimes statewide.  
Figure F in an earlier section depicted the property and violent crime rates in the United 
States and California from 1985 through 2018 to provide an overview of crime trends during the 
past several decades. Figure J depicts property and violent crime rates in the United States and 
California from 2010 to 2018, for the purpose of providing a clearer visual image of the change 
in crime rates per year (the data represented in Figure J are also presented in numerical format in 





Figure J: Crime Rates in the United States and California (2010-2018) 
Source: (RAND Corporation, 2020). 
Figure J clearly shows that the property crime rate in the United States decreased steadily 
from 2010 through 2018. The California property crime rate, however, dipped in 2011, increased 
by 6.8% in 2012, and started decreasing again through 2013. It increased by 7.6% from 2014 to 
2015 and started decreasing again steadily through 2018. The violent crime rate increased by 8% 
from 2014 to 2015, by 4% from 2015 to 2016, and again by another 2% from 2016 to 2017 
before it started to decrease in 2018.  
These data show that there was an increase in California property crime rates 





noted by several researchers (Bird, Lofstrom, et al., 2018; Dooley-Sammuli, 2015; Males, 2016; 
SJAP, 2015).  These researchers also noted that although statewide crime trends did not change 
significantly, county and city crime rates varied in the way they were impacted by the 
implementation of Proposition 47. Figure K shows Santa Clara County property and violent 
crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Figure K: Santa Clara County Crime Rates (2010-2017) 
 
Source: (Open Justice, 2020) 
These data also show that violent crime rates in the county increased steadily for three 





on the County of Santa Clara. The data compares crime and arrest rates in the county per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2007, 2016, and 2017.  
Table 11: Santa Clara County Crime and Arrest Rates (2007, 2016, and 2017) 






Violent Crime 321.4 281 308.2 -12.6% -4.1% 9.7% 
Property Crime 2,552.1 2,217.2 2,310.7 -13.1% -9.5% 4.2% 
Felony Arrest 1,095.5 525.2 532.3 -52.1% -51.4% 1.4% 
Misdemeanor Arrest 2,546.6 1,382.9 1,378.6 -45.7% -45.9% -0.3% 
Source: (BSCC, 2018b) 
These data show that both violent crime and property crime rates increased in Santa Clara 
County between 2016 and 2017. These data also show significant changes in arrest rates from 
2007 to 2016, both decreasing by over 45%. When comparing arrest rates from 2016 and 2017, 
the changes are much less drastic, with felony arrests increasing slightly and misdemeanor 
arrests decreasing slightly. These data illustrate a significant change in the number of arrests 
being made by law enforcement. The data referenced in this section supports an assertion that the 
implementation of Proposition 47 was followed by an increase in certain crimes statewide. While 
the publicly available data shows correlation, it is inadequate to conclude causation.  
Significant Observation 6: The implementation of Proposition 47 resulted in a documented 
increase in certain crimes within the City of Campbell. 
In answering the research question and assembling evidence by means of a literature review, 
it became apparent that the impact of Proposition 47 varied at the state, county and city levels. In 
addition to answering whether or not Proposition 47 was an effective solution to the problem of 
prison overcrowding, this project sought to explore the specific impact of Proposition 47 on the 





from 2005 – 2019 (the data presented in this figure are also presented in numerical form in Table 
23 in Appendix A). 
Figure L: Total Part I and Part II Crime Trends in Campbell, CA (2005-2019) 
 
Source: (CPD Department Statistics, 2005-2019) 
 Given the fact that murder and manslaughter are two crimes which very seldom occur in 
Campbell, there is little benefit to presenting them graphically. Between 2005 and 2019, 7 
homicides and 1 manslaughter occurred in the city of Campbell. The homicides occurred in 
2005, 2007, two occurred in 2013, and one each in 2014, 2015, and 2017. The manslaughter 
occurred in 2013. 
Figure M shows the total of adults arrested and adults booked into the Santa Clara County 
Jail by year from 2005 to 2019 (the data presented in this figure are also presented in numerical 





Figure M: Campbell PD Adult Arrests Compared to Bookings (2005-2019) 
 
Source: (CPD Department Statistics, 2005-2019) 
A review of the Campbell Police Department statistics revealed that while the number of 
adults arrested increased by 1.7% in the year after Proposition 47 was implemented, the number 
of arrestees that were booked into jail decreased by 0.9%. The 0.8% difference can most likely 
be attributed to a rise in “cite and release” arrests as compared to an arrest where the offender is 
booked into jail. Due to data limitations, this cannot be confirmed. A factor which could affect 
this statistic are arrestees who are released per section 849(b) of the penal code. This section 
allows for arrestees to be released without going through the booking process in situations where 
they need medical attention or are otherwise unable to be booked. 
The number of bookings decreased by 3.3% between 2014 and 2016, and decreased by a 
total of 22% between 2014 and 2019. This also represents a significant change in arrest practices 





were booked into jail by year, as well as the percentage of total bookings at the Santa Clara 
County jail stemming from Campbell PD arrests.  
Figure N: Campbell PD Percentage of Arrestees and Bookings 
 
Source: (CPD Department Statistics, 2005-2019) 
These data show that the percentage of arrestees booked into jail by the Campbell Police 
Department did not vary much after the implementation of Proposition 47. The number of 
bookings decreased by two percentage points between 2014 and 2015, by 0.3 percentage points 
between 2015 and 2016, but then increased by 3.6 percentage points between 2016 and 2017. 
The number of bookings started decreasing steadily after 2017. At the same time, there was a 






Table 12 is a portion of Figure P in Appendix C. Select offenses were displayed in order to 
easily see trends in the last six years. These years were chosen to include one year prior to the 
implementation of Proposition 47 through 2019. The crime rate per 10,000 inhabitants was 
calculated for each offense. In order to calculate this rate, the number of offenses was divided by 
the total population for that year, then multiplied by 10,000.  
Table 12: City of Campbell Crime Rates by Offense per 10,000 Inhabitants 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
City of Campbell population: 40,161 41,993 41,119 42,584 40,939 42,466 43,250 
Part 1 Crimes               
Rape 3.0 3.3 2.7 3.5 4.6 2.6 3.7 
Robbery 6.0 5.0 7.3 7.7 6.6 8.2 3.2 
Assault 13.7 10.7 11.4 13.4 14.4 16.7 6.2 
Simple Assaults* 77.7 77.4 75.1 81.3 76.9 54.6 40.0 
Burglary 84.9 74.5 60.1 58.5 58.4 55.6 29.4 
Theft 253.0 207.9 244.7 213.0 223.7 229.8 155.6 
Motor Vehicle Theft 51.3 48.1 34.5 35.2 42.7 39.6 24.7 
Part 2 Crimes               
Other Assaults 16.4 19.8 18.0 18.6 20.5 32.0 29.1 
Forgery & Counterfeiting 11.0 10.2 7.8 8.9 7.6 8.2 5.8 
Fraud 21.7 26.0 35.5 37.3 34.0 22.4 33.8 
Embezzlement 1.2 1.4 1.7 0.9 0.7 1.9 0.9 
Stolen Property 6.7 6.2 5.8 7.7 7.8 6.8 6.2 
Vandalism 73.7 59.3 58.6 50.0 52.5 27.8 25.4 
Weapons 6.5 6.0 8.0 9.2 9.5 11.3 16.9 
Prostitution & Vice 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Sex Offenses 8.0 4.8 8.3 4.9 6.4 9.4 5.5 
Drug Abuse Violations 53.0 76.4 69.8 78.0 82.8 82.7 97.6 
Gambling 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Offenses Against Family & Children 4.5 2.4 1.7 2.1 2.4 3.1 1.2 
DUI 73.5 56.0 81.7 57.3 52.8 49.7 53.9 
Liquor Laws 4.2 1.4 2.2 1.2 0.7 0.9 2.3 
Drunk in Public 78.7 78.8 89.0 65.8 68.4 45.4 40.0 
Disorderly Conduct 4.7 4.3 2.7 4.9 5.6 5.2 0.9 
All Other 178.8 191.0 166.8 177.8 176.8 189.3 229.1 
Auto Burglary/Theft of 
Motor Vehicles Parts/Acc. 96.1 86.2 89.0 62.5 77.7 113.3 87.2 
Bike Theft 18.9 16.0 22.1 22.3 13.2 12.2 6.7 





 A review of the data shows that the crime rate for burglary offenses has been declining 
steadily since 2013. The theft crime rate decreased by 45.1 between 2013 to 2014 then increased 
by 36.8 between 2014 and 2015. Fraud increased by 9.5 from 2014 to 2015. The drug abuse 
violations crime rate increased by 23.4 between 2013 and 2014, decreased by 6.6 in 2015, and 
increased steadily through 2019. The drug abuse violations crime rate was 53 in 2013 and 97.6 in 
2019, an increase of 44.6. Based on these data, it appears that drug abuse violations and theft 
were the crimes that exhibited the most change before and after the implementation of 
Proposition 47. This is not unexpected since both are considered Proposition 47 offenses.  
 Figure O shows changes in calls for service and directed activity within the Campbell 
Police Department from 2005 to 2019. Calls for service are generated when an individual calls 
and requests assistance or reports a crime. Directed activity is proactive traffic or law 





Figure O: Campbell PD Trends in Calls for Service and Directed Activity 
 
Source: (CPD Department Statistics, 2005-2019) 
It is interesting to note that both calls for service and directed activity appear to decrease after 
the implementation of Proposition 47. It would be very interesting to see how these statistics 
compare to other cities in the area.  
Limitations 
The Campbell Police Department statistics did not differentiate between misdemeanor and 
felony offenses. The data did not document differences in terms of property value for theft-
related offenses. It also did not differentiate between the number of actual “cite and release” 
arrests and booking arrests by offense. Given these the researcher was unable to conduct further 





the department level would facilitate evaluating the impact of future criminal justice reforms on 
local arrest, cite and release and booking practices. 
While it is apparent that Proposition 47 is funding a variety of programs committed to 
providing re-entry support services, funding trauma recovery centers, reducing truancy and 
recidivism, no outcome evaluations of programs that have received Proposition 47 grants were 
publicly available at the time of this research. As a result, data regarding the effectiveness of 
Proposition 47 grant recipient programs and their impact on at-risk youth, recidivism, and the 
recently released offender population does not exist. It is unknown how effective these programs 
have been at reaching these specific goals. Until outcome evaluations are completed, the exact 
impact of these programs on overall crime trends and on society as a whole, will remain unclear. 
It is possible that the outcomes of certain programs will not become apparent until a significant 
amount of time has passed, such as programs funded by the California Department of Education 
that are geared towards at-risk youth in the K-12 education system. It is likely that the impact of 
these programs on youth (besides changes in truancy/drop-out rates) will not be adequately 







The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47) was created and implemented as a 
way of gaining and maintaining compliance with a court-ordered state prison population cap. Its 
explicitly stated goals consisted of reducing government spending on nonviolent offenders and 
redirecting the resulting cost savings to community based rehabilitative, diversion, and support 
programs. Proposition 47 also had the implicit goal of acting as a state prison population 
reduction measure. This information was garnered from the nature of the changes the act 
implemented, the professional research conducted about the act, the way it was characterized in 
the media, and the way in which it was presented in California state budget documents. These 
explicit and implicit goals speak to the problem the measure was designed to address: prison 
overcrowding.  
The findings in this project demonstrate that Proposition 47 remained true to its 
legislative intent and has accomplished what it sought to achieve. However, they also suggest 
that the measure was implemented in a rushed and haphazard manner that resulted in lost 
opportunities for data collection and population tracking. In order to ensure that a program or 
policy achieves a good outcome, evaluations must be conducted in a logical order (Posavac, 
2011). First, the need must be identified and properly measured, and a program must then be 
carefully planned and implemented according to this plan. If any of these steps are circumvented, 
it is not likely that a good outcome will be achieved (Posavac, 2011). 
In assembling the evidence for this evaluation, the researcher discovered that the measure 
was created by two men in top administrative positions within California criminal justice 
agencies, one being a Chief of Police and the other a District Attorney. While this fact was 





overcrowding was not as obvious. Due to the direct nature of California’s initiative process, to 
the average uninformed voter, “who knows little about these ballot measures other than the noise 
on television”, it seemed as if the policy response just appeared on the ballot (Gerston, p. 245).  
Gerston (2012) explains that special interest groups deliberately “label their proposals with titles 
far from their intent” in order to influence the initiative process (p. 245). This is, in part, what 
occurred when Proposition 47 was presented to the voters. The measure was cleverly titled the 
“Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.” In just reading this title, the average voter would have 
no idea that it actually sponsored the early release of incarcerated individuals and the reduction 
of penalties for some criminal offenses. 
After the implementation of Proposition 47, several researchers voiced their concerns 
regarding the tendency of law enforcement to resist the changes implemented by Proposition 47 
(Dooley-Sammuli, 2015; Nguyen, 2015). In explaining the purpose of a process evaluation, 
Sylvia and Sylvia (2012) state that “[e]mployee resistance to change can be overcome by 
involving them in the problem-analysis and solution development stages of the process” (p. 93). 
It is possible that law enforcement professionals would have been more receptive to this type of 
reform had they been more involved in the process of identifying a solution.  
As Sylvia and Sylvia (2012) noted, “bureaucracy is made of interdependent subunit 
specialties that tend to have a narrow rather than a broad worldview” (p. 97). Every agency that 
plays a role in the criminal justice system was affected by the implementation of Proposition 47. 
Most agencies were not prepared to take on the additional workload created by the passage of 
this measure. Being that they were ultimately responsible for the actual work of implementing 
Proposition 47, they would have been more adequately prepared if they had been included in the 





beginning stages of a policy response resulted in the failure of agencies to collect and maintain 
sufficient data for an evaluation to be conducted at a later date. If evaluation criteria had been 
selected in advance of the implementation, comprehensive data collection could have begun as 
soon as the measure went into effect. 
While there is an abundance of research on prison overcrowding and sentencing reform, 
there is very little scholarly research which focuses specifically on the Safe Neighborhoods and 
Schools Act. The vast majority of the research conducted about Proposition 47 to this date was 
conducted periodically by the affected agencies and by other criminal justice research institutions 
and non-profit organizations. The data collection in each study or report mentioned in this work 
was inconsistent or incomplete. Given that Proposition 47 was a new initiative and research was 
being conducted with the data that was available at the time, this issue was to be expected. 
However, it does speak volumes about the way data collection is conducted in criminal justice 
agencies.  
Since there was no unified approach to data collection about offenders or cost saving 
tracking methods, affected agencies were at a loss when attempting to determine the exact 
impact of Proposition 47 on their workloads and finances. Research institutions and non-profit 
organizations resorted to attempting research and analysis with inconsistent and incomplete data. 
While their findings shed light on the impact of Proposition 47, they are nevertheless incomplete 
and do not represent the impact on the state criminal justice system as a whole. In order to 
conduct an accurate process evaluation, outcome evaluation, or even an analysis of crime rate 
trends and recidivism, researchers must have access to accurate and complete data. The criminal 





compatible with each other and tracking the same data) to track the plethora of data generated on 
an everyday basis. This would ensure accuracy, consistency, and completeness. 
In taking a cost-effectiveness approach to evaluating Proposition 47, it is evident from the 
findings that the measure has been extremely effective in achieving its desired outputs despite a 
less than ideal start (Sylvia & Sylvia, 2020). The findings demonstrate that not only has it 
ensured continued compliance with the court-ordered prison population caps, it has continually 
generated more monetary savings that are being automatically re-invested in the community. 
This in itself is evidence of the measure’s administrative robustness (Bardach & Patashnik, 
2020). These two policy outcomes – meeting prison population goals and diverting money from 
incarceration to social programs – appear to be extremely successful, irrespective of the abrupt 
way in which Proposition 47 was implemented. 
Areas for further research 
 The purpose of conducting a process evaluation is to ensure that an organization is 
running as it should be. Process evaluations are also used to ensure that a policy or program is 
being implemented appropriately, in order to “maximize the public interest” (Bardach & 
Patashnik, 2020, p. 33). Evaluations should be done periodically to check that policies and 
programs have not deviated from this standard. In the case of Proposition 47, the findings 
support continuing to implement the policy, while demonstrating the need to collect complete 
and accurate data that would allow for a clearer understanding of its impact on local, county-
wide, and state-wide crime rates and trends.  
For example, there has been a notable increase in property crime both locally and 
statewide. It has been argued that Proposition 47 increased retail theft crimes by increasing the 





significant increase in vehicle burglaries in the Bay Area in 2019 (Salonga, Hurd & Kelliher, 
2020). The California Police Chief’s Association determined that the property crime rate in 
California had increased over 7% in the year after Proposition 47 as compared to the year before 
it passed (League of California Cities [LOCC], 2017). The property crime rate in the rest of the 
United States declined by over 4% during the same time period (LOCC, 2017).  
There have been several attempts to modify the changes made by Proposition 47. In 
March of 2017, the League of California Cities announced their support of Assembly Bill 1326 
which sought to address the increase in theft-related crimes. AB 1326 would have allowed law 
enforcement to “aggregate the monetary value of property stolen by an individual over the course 
of a year, and authorize felony prosecution if that monetary value meets the $950 threshold” 
(LOCC, 2017, para. 4). However, a final hearing for the bill was canceled on April 18th, 2017 by 
the author (C.L.I, n.d.e.). 
Assembly Bill 1065 (A.B. 1065) was proposed in 2017 in response to this increase (CLI, 
2018). Approved by the Governor on September 27th, 2018, A.B. 1065 created Section 490.4 of 
the California Penal Code (CLI, 2018). This section made it a crime to act in concert with two or 
more people to shoplift with the “intent to sell, exchange, or return the merchandise for value” 
(CLI, 2018). While still relatively new, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s office has 
already had great success in prosecuting cases involving millions of dollars’ worth of recovered 
stolen property under the organized retail crime theft section (Geha, 2020). Most recently, the 
“Reducing Crime and Keeping California Safe Act of 2018” has been accepted as a measure to 
appear on the ballot in November of 2020 (OAG, 2017). This ballot initiative seeks to reform the 






These attempts enact legislative change show that elected officials and stakeholders 
believe Proposition 47 contributed to an increase in crime rates. Can the increases in these types 
of crime actually be attributed to the change in the felony threshold amount, or to changes in 
police arrest practices, or to district attorney charging practices for Proposition 47 offenses? 
Understanding the cause and effect relationship between newly created crimes (like organized 
retail theft) and Proposition 47 crimes is necessary for a complete evaluation of the measure and 
its impact on society. The nature of this relationship will remain elusive unless the state 
government, the criminal justice system, and all affected agencies are able to collect more 
complete data. 
While the findings support making small adjustments in order to improve Proposition 
47’s implementation, with the hopes of improving its eventual outputs and outcomes, there is 
currently no data to guide policy makers in selecting the adjustments most likely to generate 
positive change. The review of the literature makes it apparent that agencies have struggled with 
calculating cost savings, collecting and maintaining data, measuring the impact of 
implementation on their own agencies, and population tracking of those who are granted relief 
under Proposition 47. There is no consistent data collection by the CDE or CalVCB to prove 
whether investing in these activities is the most efficient way to use the savings generated by 
Proposition 47. This is an ongoing need that should be addressed. One possible way to address 
this need would be the creation of a state-wide database, or at least a standardized data collection 
tool to assist all agencies in maintaining consistent data. 
 Another area of research which should be explored is the actual harm caused to society as 
a result of Proposition 47. The review of the literature focuses on the positive outcomes of the 





glosses over the negative outcomes. While the increase in property crimes statewide has been 
documented and accepted by researchers, there was no specific benefit-cost analysis conducted 
to determine the financial impact of this negative outcome (Sylvia & Sylvia, 2020). There is no 
systematic study documenting the exact cost of the increase in property crimes. A study of this 
nature would have to take into account the exact financial loss as a result of the increased 
property crime itself, the cost of medical and mental health care for the victims, and the increase 
in the cost of insurance for the impacted communities. In addition, it would need to include the 
cost of the subsequent law enforcement investigation, the cost of the subsequent criminal 
prosecution and potential incarceration or community supervision of these offenders – on a 
statewide basis. Cross-sectoral studies would also be needed to understand how Proposition 47 
has impacted crime trends when studied with other social and legal change, like the legalization 
of marijuana sales, possession, use and cultivation, and the impact of the shelter-in-place orders 
for COVID-19 in 2020. Did the decreased opportunity to commit retail theft (due to businesses 
being closed) lead to an increase in home invasion robberies, package thefts, and financial 
crimes? 
The benefit-cost analysis would compare the total financial loss to the total monetary 
gain (as evidenced by the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Fund) from of Proposition 47. The 







 California has dealt with the issue of prison overcrowding for several decades. Creative 
policy responses to this issue were developed after the Supreme Court of the United States 
upheld a decision by a specially convened panel of California judges imposing prison population 
caps which had to be met within certain time frames. When Public Safety Realignment (AB 109) 
failed to decrease the prison population sufficiently, Proposition 47 was authored and 
implemented. Soon after its implementation, prison populations fell below the court-ordered 
population caps for the first time. Prison populations have remained below these caps for the last 
five years.  
This research explored the implementation of Proposition 47 in its first five years. It 
sought to fill a gap in the literature by conducting a process evaluation of its implementation and 
making recommendations for improvement. It also explored its impact on the Campbell Police 
Department. While Proposition 47 has proven to be efficient in achieving its stated goals, this 
research has made it apparent that there is a large gap in the academic literature focused on this 
policy that requires improving and expanding current data collection methods. The BSCC, CDE 
and CalVCB should require grant recipients to conduct outcome evaluations for each program 
and participant, with longitudinal outcome studies for the programs that receive consistent grant 
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Table 13: Proposition 47 Applications/Petitions (November 2014- September 2015) 
County Petitions Applications Total Population Corrections 
Funding 
Alameda     1,031 1,583,979 $34,600,000 
Butte 1,322 213 1,535 223,905 $7,270,993 
Contra Costa 614 156 770 1,096,637 $22,407,133 
El Dorado 524 204 728 183,957 $4,376,059 
Fresno 5,187 1,580 6,767 967,491 $23,152,815 
Humboldt 486 299 785 134,609 $3,866,946 
Imperial 19 2 21 181,103 $3,829,100 
Kern 2,006 2,906 4,912 872,322 $33,598,584 
Kings 899 427 1,326 149,788 $8,886,914 
Lake 276 91 367 64,744 $2,655,713 
Los Angeles 16,142 9,020 25,162 10,069,036 $317,576,000 
Madera 355 515 870 154,278 $4,816,413 
Marin 109 73 182 258,324 $3,237,452 
Mendocino 124 63 187 88,545 $3,124,496 
Merced 372 93 465 265,069 $7,256,499 
Monterey 543 270 813 425,365 $12,326,710 
Napa 51 66 117 140,348 $1,877,813 
Nevada 74 56 130 98,235 $2,039,766 
Orange 17,257 5,286 22,543 3,132,681 $68,629,453 
Placer 769 299 1,068 369,726 $7,331,927 
Riverside 7,298 1,752 9,050 2,295,298 $52,794,731 
Sacramento 6,872 1,398 8,270 1,460,480 $36,152,316 
San Bernardino 3,690 1,942 5,632 2,091,618 $63,942,850 
San Diego     37,268 3,212,298 $67,120,000 
San Francisco 483 250 733 837,831 $31,819,000 
San Joaquin 1,404 1,288 2,692 711,797 $17,408,453 
San Luis Obispo 714 273 987 273,323 $6,478,084 
San Mateo 800 789 1,589 748,438 $16,556,322 
Santa Barbara 1,174 231 1,405 436,516 $9,635,672 
Santa Clara 775 1,120 1,895 1,874,526 $51,447,677 
Santa Cruz 962 257 1,219 271,857 $6,261,044 
Shasta 1,285 447 1,732 178,522 $7,221,617 
Solano 247 704 951 427,743 $14,461,318 
Sonoma 1,039 489 1,528 495,684 $12,274,697 
Stanislaus     3,076 530,327 $16,761,278 
Sutter 422 125 547 96,408 $3,004,699 
Tulare 361 1,268 1,629 459,176 $12,723,594 
Ventura 2,319 1,731 4,050 844,259 $20,250,030 
Yolo     1,431 207,212 $7,596,491 
Yuba 203 133 336 73,425 $2,500,000 






Table 14: Proposition 47 Applications/Petitions (November 2014- September 2019) 
County Petitions  Applications Total Adult  Total Juvenile 
Alameda 15,442 0 15,442 5 
Alpine 0 0 0 0 
Amador 161 204 365 0 
Butte 1836 669 2,505 1 
Calaveras 192 145 337 0 
Contra Costa 9,416 717 10,133 264 
Del Norte 115 53 168 5 
El Dorado 703 659 1,362 0 
Fresno 7,489 7,403 14,892 82 
Glenn 129 135 264 2 
Humboldt 574 514 1,088 0 
Imperial 452 251 703 0 
Inyo 35 10 45 0 
Kern 2,889 10,238 13,127 0 
Kings 2,367 4,245 6,612 0 
Lake 360 183 543 0 
Lassen 126 80 206 0 
Los Angeles 29,494 35,677 65,171 15 
Madera 417 748 1,165 0 
Marin 208 522 730 0 
Mariposa 13 20 33 0 
Mendocino 155 186 341 0 
Merced 572 304 876 0 
Modoc 16 7 23 0 
Mono 68 74 142 0 
Monterey 738 1,056 1,794 36 
Napa 74 265 339 0 
Nevada 84 138 222 0 
Orange 19,166 18,563 37,729 57 
Placer 988 622 1,610 10 
Plumas 37 29 66 0 
Riverside 9,186 6,151 15,337 116 
Sacramento 7,677 4,989 12,666 2 
San Benito 261 99 360 0 
San Bernardino 5,647 8,714 14,361 78 
San Diego 48,799 2,844 51,643 563 
San Francisco 651 1,946 2,597 36 
San Joaquin 4,137 19,032 23,169 0 
San Luis Obispo 973 730 1,703 0 
San Mateo 4,278 7,636 11,914 1 
Santa Barbara 1,655 2,993 4,648 0 
Santa Clara 1,117 4,584 5,701 0 
Santa Cruz 1,873 2,732 4,605 1 
Shasta 3 2 5 0 
Siskiyou 157 40 197 10 
Solano 270 2,498 2,768 18 
Sonoma 1,280 1,071 2,351 17 
Stanislaus 3,995 1,740 5,735 0 
Sutter 540 306 846 0 
Tehama 482 344 826 1 
Trinity 54 34 88 47 
Tulare 2,389 3,152 5,541 5 
Ventura 2,469 17,178 19,647 291 
Yolo 3,711 287 3,998 66 
Yuba 227 226 453 36 






Table 15: BSCC Proposition 47 Cohort 1 Grant Recipients 
Recipient Amount 
Alameda County Health Services Department $6 million 
Contra Costa County Health Services Department  $5.98 million 
City of Corning  $1 million 
El Rancho Unified School District  $997,436 
City of LA, City Attorney’s Office  $6 million 
City of LA Mayor’s Office of Reentry  $5.99 million 
LA County Department of Health Services, Office of Diversion & Reentry  $20 million 
Marin County Health and Human Services  $998,504 
Merced County Probation Department  $945,666 
Monterey County Health Department Behavioral Health Bureau  $6 million 
Oceanside Unified School District  $998,300 
Orange County Health Care Agency  $6 million 
Pasadena City Police Department  $2.51 million 
Placer County Health and Human Services  $990,000 
Plumas County District Attorney  $1 million 
City of Rialto  $997,977 
Riverside University Health System Behavioral Health  $6 million 
San Bernardino County Department of Public Health  $1.25 million 
San Diego County  $6 million 
San Francisco Department of Public Health  $6 million 
San Joaquin County Behavioral Human Services  $6 million 
Solano County Health and Social Services $6 million 
Yolo County Health and Human Services Agency  $5.97 million  







Table 16: BSCC Proposition 47 Cohort 2 Grant Recipients 
Source: (BSCC, 2019b). 
 
Recipient Amount 
Alameda County Health Care Services Agency $6 million 
City of Compton  $3 million 
Contra Costa Behavioral Health Services $5,936,088 
City of Corning  $3,535,485 
Corona-Norco Unified School District $1 million 
City of Hayward  $999,881 
LA City Attorney’s Office  $6 million 
LA County Department of Health Services, Office of Diversion & Reentry  $18,616,627 
LA Mayor’s Office of Economic Opportunity, Office of Reentry  5,999,304 
Marin County Health and Human Services  $999,965 
Monterey County Health Department, Behavioral Health Bureau  $6 million 
Nevada County Department of Behavioral Health  $1 million 
Orange County Health Care Agency  $6 million 
Pasadena Unified School District   $999,528 
Placer County Health and Human Services  $6 million 
Plumas County District Attorney’s Office $1 million 
San Francisco Department of Public Health  $6 million 
Santa Ana Unified School District  $2,756,857 
Santa Barbara County Office of the Public Defender  $5,998,511 
Santa Clara County Behavioral Health Services Department  $5,999,171 
Santa Cruz County Probation Department  $5,998,164 
Shasta county Probation Department   $1 million 





Table 17: CDE Proposition 47 Grant Recipients Cohort 1 (2017-2020) 
County Grant Recipient Amount 
Alameda Alameda County Office of Education $1,759,400  
Alameda Hayward Unified School District $1,759,400  
Alameda Leadership Public Schools Oakland R&D $192,628  
Alameda Oakland Unified School District $1,759,400  
Alameda San Leandro Unified School District $1,139,563  
Colusa Pierce Joint Unified School District $195,293  
Contra Costa West Contra Costa Unified School District $1,759,400  
Del Norte Del Norte County Office of Education $542,335  
Imperial Brawley Elementary School District $526,764  
Imperial Brawley Union High School District $243,589  
Imperial Central Union High School District $543,443  
Kern Kernville Union Elementary School District $116,252  
Kern McFarland Unified School District $327,239  
Kings Reef Sunset Unified School District $349,681  
Los Angeles Bellflower Unified School District $1,045,955  
Los Angeles El Rancho Unified School District $1,155,134  
Los Angeles Los Angeles Unified School District $1,753,418  
Los Angeles Pomona Unified School District $1,759,400  
Madera Madera Unified School District $1,759,400  
Mendocino Ukiah Unified School District $782,625  
Riverside Banning Unified School District $562,128  
Riverside Coachella Valley Unified School District $1,544,723  
Riverside Desert Sands Unified School District $1,174,751  
Riverside Hemet Unified School District $954,914  
Sacramento Sacramento City Unified School District $1,707,854  
Sacramento San Juan Unified School District $1,365,998  
San Benito Hollister School District $533,494  
San Benito San Benito County Office of Education $555,122  
San Bernardino San Bernardino Unified School District $1,759,400  
San Joaquin Lodi Unified School District $1,701,032  
Shasta Shasta County Office of Education $940,707  
Sonoma Santa Rosa High $1,076,615  
Stanislaus Stanislaus County Office of Education $1,758,168  
Tehama Red Bluff Joint Union High School $214,559  
Tulare Visalia Unified School District $1,759,400  
 Total Grants Awarded: $37,079,184  









Table 18: CDE Proposition 47 Grant Recipients Cohort 2 (2018-2021) 
County Grant Recipient Amount 
Butte Thermalito Union Elementary School District $228,420  
Contra Costa Pittsburg Unified School District $1,521,045  
Fresno Fresno Unified School District $1,103,861  
Los Angeles Pasadena Unified School District $1,760,000  
Los Angeles South Whittier Elementary School District $417,405  
Mariposa Mariposa County Unified School District $252,900  
Mendocino Mendocino County Office of Education $681,343  
Merced Merced County Office of Education $70,350  
Merced Merced Union High School $154,960  
Napa Napa County Office of Education $25,950  
Riverside Palm Springs Unified School District $1,402,276  
San Bernardino Morongo Unified School District $702,266  
San Diego Oceanside Unified School District $1,760,000  
Stanislaus Patterson Joint Unified School District $842,212  
Tulare Tulare County Office of Education $757,068  
Tuolumne Tuolumne County Superintendent of Schools $838,488  
Yolo Washington Unified School District $1,077,300  
 Total Grants Awarded: $13,595,844  
Source: (CDE, 2019c). 
 
Table 19: CDE Proposition 47 Grant Recipients Cohort 3 (2019-2022) 
County Grant Recipient Amount 
San Diego Grossmont Union High School District $1,800,000  
Kern Kern High School District $1,800,000  
Los Angeles Lancaster Elementary School District $1,800,000  
Los Angeles Long Beach Unified School District $1,520,466  
Stanislaus Modesto City Elementary School District $1,013,931  
Riverside Moreno Valley Unified School District $1,490,940  
Napa Napa Valley Unified School District $1,800,000  
Humboldt Northern Humboldt Union High School District $1,327,008  
Butte Palermo Union Elementary School District $194,400  
San Diego San Diego County Office of Education $1,799,998  
San Joaquin San Joaquin County Office of Education $283,200  
Santa Clara San Jose Unified $1,800,000  
Kern Standard Elementary School District $450,000  
San Joaquin Stockton Unified School District $1,544,021  
 Total Grants Awarded: $18,623,964  
Source: (CDE, 2019d). 
 
Table 20: CDE Proposition 47 Grant Recipients Cohort 4 (2020-2023) 





Alameda Hayward Unified School District $1,932,902  
Alameda Oakland Unified School District $1,996,300  
Contra Costa Antioch Unified School District $818,100  
Contra Costa Contra Costa County Office of Education $283,650  
Humboldt Humboldt County Office of Education $1,883,550  
Imperial Brawley Elementary School District $599,100  
Kern Kern County Office of Education $118,573  
Lake Lake County Office of Education $1,436,250  
Los Angeles Los Angeles County Office of Education $2,000,000  
Mendocino Ukiah Unified School District $903,300  
Merced Los Banos Unified School District $605,400  
Sacramento Sacramento City Unified School District $1,944,499  
Sacramento San Juan Unified School District $1,578,750  
Sacramento Twin Rivers Unified School District $1,729,542  
San Bernardino Victor Valley Unified School District $1,999,998  
Santa Clara Alum Rock Union Elementary School District $1,276,400  
Santa Clara Santa Clara County Office of Education $2,000,000  
Solano Fairfield-Suisun Unified School District $2,000,000  
Solano Solano County Office of Education $15,000  
Stanislaus Stanislaus County Office of Education $2,000,000  
Sutter Sutter County Office of Education $761,550  
 Total Grants Awarded: $27,882,864  
 Source: (CDE, 2020). 
 
Table 21: CAL VCB Proposition 47 Grant Recipients (2020-2021) 
Cal Victim Compensation Board Grant Recipient Amount 
Alameda County Family Justice Center $1,970,972 
Christian Counseling Service’s Trauma Recovery Center $997,895 
Downtown Women’s Center in Los Angeles $2,373,173 
Long Beach Recovery Center $3,089,511 
Miracles Counseling Center in Gardena $1,204,877 
University of California San Francisco Trauma Recovery Center $2,334,825 
South Alameda County Trauma Recovery Center $1,596,090 
Total Grants Awarded: $13,567,343  





Table 22 : United States and California Crime Rates per 100,000 people (1985-2018) 








1985 765.3 558.1 5752.7 4666.4 
1986 920.5 620.1 5842.3 4881.8 
1987 918 612.5 5588.4 4963 
1988 929.8 640.6 5705.7 5054 
1989 977.7 666.9 5785.8 5107.1 
1990 1045.2 729.6 5558.4 5073.1 
1991 1089.9 758.2 5682.7 5140.2 
1992 1119.7 757.7 5559.8 4903.7 
1993 1077.8 747.1 5379.1 4740 
1994 1013 713.6 5160.8 4660.2 
1995 966 684.5 4865.1 4590.5 
1996 862.7 636.6 4345.1 4451 
1997 798.3 611 4067.1 4316.5 
1998 703.7 567.6 3639.1 4052.5 
1999 627.2 523 3177.8 3743.6 
2000 621.6 506.5 3118.2 3618.3 
2001 615.2 504.5 3278 3658.1 
2002 595.4 494.4 3361.2 3630.6 
2003 579.6 475.8 3426.4 3591.2 
2004 527.8 463.2 3423.9 3514.1 
2005 526 469 3320.6 3431.5 
2006 533.5 479.3 3181.7 3346.6 
2007 524.1 471.8 3043.5 3276.4 
2008 504.2 458.6 2941 3214.6 
2009 473.3 431.9 2731 3041.3 
2010 439.6 404.5 2629.9 2945.9 
2011 411.2 387.1 2584.2 2905.4 
2012 423.5 387.8 2761.8 2868 
2013 402.6 369.1 2651.2 2733.6 
2014 396.4 361.6 2441.7 2574.1 
2015 428 373.7 2628.4 2500.5 
2016 444.8 397.5 2550 2451.6 
2017 453.3 394.9 2505.3 2362.9 
2018 447.4 380.6 2380.4 2199.5 





Table 23: Campbell PD Part I and Part II crimes (2005-2019) 
Year Total Part 1 Crimes Total Part 2 Crimes 
2005 1307 1987 
2006 1332 2033 
2007 1635 2097 
2008 1485 2159 
2009 1556 2232 
2010 1578 2111 
2011 1483 2284 
2012 1754 2303 
2013 1668 2518 
2014 1492 2629 
2015 1498 2619 
2016 1425 2606 
2017 1448 2496 
2018 1522 2351 
2019 974 2574 
























at County Jail 
% of Total 
Booked 
2005 134 42 31.3% 1359 NA  
2006 151 34 22.5% 1311 901 68.7% 
2007 232 43 18.5% 1251 855 68.3% 
2008 218 43 19.7% 1488 957 64.3% 
2009 196 51 26.0% 1331 868 65.2% 
2010 236 78 33.1% 1494 981 65.7% 
2011 144 62 43.1% 1467 1006 68.6% 
2012 152 41 27.0% 1535 1113 72.5% 
2013 145 62 42.8% 1893 1318 69.6% 
2014 145 43 29.7% 2063 1525 73.9% 
2015 92 19 20.7% 2100 1510 71.9% 
2016 111 23 20.7% 2058 1474 71.6% 
2017 75 37 49.3% 2018 1518 75.2% 
2018 44 5 11.4% 1655 1236 74.7% 
2019 66 8 12.1% 1646 1189 72.2% 



























Crime Statistics Report 
 
Part I Crimes 
Part I crime statistics are compiled from written police reports and are generated from the 
Records Management System. If a call is created in the Computer Aided Dispatch system and a 
crime report is not written, the crime is not tallied. 
 
Homicide 
This category includes Murders and Non-negligent Manslaughters. Does not include Suicides, 
Accidental Deaths, Traffic Fatalities and Attempted Murders. 
 
Manslaughter 
This category includes Manslaughter by Negligence. Does not include Deaths of Persons due to 




This category includes Rape by Force and Attempts to Commit Forcible Rape. 
 
Robbery 
This category includes all Robberies (theft or larceny aggravated by element of force or threat of 
force). This category does not include pocket picking or purse snatching unless force or threat of 
force is used to overcome the active resistance of the victim. 
 
Assault 
This category includes Aggravated Assault by firearm, knife or cutting instrument, other 
dangerous weapon, and hands/fists/feet/etc., with aggravated injury. Also includes simple, not 
aggravated assaults which do not involve use of a weapon and there was no serious or aggravated 
injuries to the victim. 
 
Burglary 
This category includes all Burglaries including Attempted Burglaries. 
 
Other Theft 
This category includes Larceny and Theft. This category also includes Attempted Thefts. Does 
not include Motor Vehicle Theft, Embezzlement, or Larceny by Check.  
 
Motor Vehicle Theft 









Part II Crimes 
 
Part II Crime Statistics are compiled from written police reports and are generated from the 
Records Management System. If a call is created in the Computer Aided Dispatch system and a 
crime report is not written, the crime is not tallied. 
 
Other Assaults 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• False Information to Police Officer; 
• Obstruct Criminal Investigation; 
• Filing a False Police Report; 
• Impersonating a Police Officer; 
• Resisting a Police Officer. 
 
Arson 
This category includes all Arson related crimes including Attempted Arson. The actual Arson 
Report is compiled by the Fire Department. The number of Arsons reported by the Fire 
Department is transferred to the Part 2 report.  
 
Forgery & Counterfeiting 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Forgery; 




This category includes Embezzlement and Attempted Embezzlement.  
 
Stolen Property 
This category includes all crimes related to Buying, Receiving or Possessing Stolen Property. It 
also includes attempts to commit any of these offenses. 
 
Vandalism 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Defacing Property; 
• Graffiti; 
• Vehicle Vandalism. 
 
Weapons 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Manufacture, Sale or Possession of Deadly Weapon; 
• Carrying a Concealed Weapon; 
• Discharging a Firearm; 
• Using or Possessing an Incendiary Device; 





• Possess/Sell Switchblade; 
• Firing at a Dwelling 
 
Prostitution & Vice 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Prostitution;  
• Pandering, Procuring, Transporting, or Detaining Women for Immoral Purposes;  
• Keeping a Place of Prostitution 
• Sexual Exploitation of Children; 
• Pimping; 
• Patronizing a Prostitute. 
 
Sex Offenses 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Incest;  
• Indecent Exposure; 
• Sexual Battery; 
• Oral Copulation; 
• Sodomy; 
• Lewd or Lascivious Acts with Children; 
• Sexual Abuse of a Child; 
• Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. 
 
Drug Abuse Violations 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Sale, Manufacturing or Possession of Opium or Cocaine, Marijuana, Synthetic Narcotics, 
and Dangerous Non-Narcotic Drugs; 
• Possession of Hypodermic Needle/Syringe; 
• Under Influence of Controlled Substance. 
 
Gambling 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Promoting, permitting, or engaging in illegal gambling including Bookmaking, Numbers 
and Lottery. 
 
Offenses Against Family and Children 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Desertion, abandonment, or nonsupport of spouse or child; 
• Neglect or abuse of spouse or child (if injury is serious, these are tallied as aggravated 
assaults); 
• Nonpayment of alimony. 
 
DUI 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 





• Operating an engine, train, streetcar, boat, etc. while under the influence. 
 
Liquor Laws 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Manufacture, sale, transporting, furnishing, possessing, etc., intoxicating liquour; 
• Maintaining unlawful drinking places; 
• Bootlegging; 
• Operating still; 
• Furnishing liquor to a minor or intemperate person; 
• Using a vehicle for illegal transportation of liquor; 
• Drinking on train or public conveyance. 
 
Drunk in public 
This category includes the following types of crimes and does not include driving under the 
influence: 
• Drunkenness;  
• Drunk and disorderly;  




This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Affray; 
• Unlawful assembly; 
• Disturbing the peace; 
• Disturbing meetings; 
• Disorderly conduct in state institutions, at court, at fairs, on trains or public conveyances, 
etc.; 
• Blasphemy, profanity and obscene language; 
• Desecrating the flag;  
• Refusing to assist an officer. 
 
Curfew 
This category includes the following types of crimes: 
• Violations of local curfew or loitering ordinances. 
 
Runaway 
This category includes apprehensions for protective custody as defined by local statute and does 
not include protective custody actions with respect to runaways taken for other jurisdictions. 
All Other 
This category includes the following types of crimes and includes attempts: 
• Admitting minors to improper places; 
• Abduction and compelling to marry; 
• Bigamy and polygamy; 






• Combination in restraint of trade, trusts, or monopolies; 
• Contempt of court; 
• Criminal anarchism; 
• Criminal syndicalism; 
• Discrimination, unfair competition; 
• Kidnapping; 
• Marriage within prohibited degrees; 
• Offense contributing to juvenile delinquency; 
• Perjury and subordination of perjury; 
• Possession, repair, manufacture, etc. of burglar’s tools; 
• Possession of drug paraphernalia; 
• Possession or sale of obscene literature, pictures, etc.; 
• Public nuisances; 
• Riot and rout; 
• Trespass; 
• Unlawfully bringing weapons into prisons or hospitals; 
• Unlawful use, possession, etc., of explosives;  
• Violations of state regulatory laws and municipal ordinances; 
• Violation of quarantine; 
• All offenses not otherwise classified. 
 
Other Crime Information 
 
Auto Burglary/Theft of Motor Vehicle Parts & Accessories 
This is a sub-category of Theft. This includes theft of articles from a motor vehicle, whether 
locked or unlocked. This category also includes Theft of Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories 
that are attached to the interior or exterior of a motor vehicle.  
 
Bike Theft 
This category includes all bicycle thefts. 
 
Hate Crimes 
This category includes all criminal acts, which cause physical injury emotional suffering or 
property damage where there is a reasonable cause to believe that the crime was motivated by 




Domestic Violence Reports without Arrest 
The total number of domestic violence calls resulting in a written report with no arrest.  
 
Domestic Violence Reports with Arrest 






Reported as Domestic Violence, Unfounded 
The total number of reported Domestic Violence Calls that were unfounded or did not meet the 




Calls for Service 
This number reflects the total number of CAD calls for service. This category does not include 
Directed Activity as outlined below. 
 
Directed Activity 
Officer-initiated activity that includes the following types of calls: 
• Person Stop 
• Person Stop – Fill Requested 
• Vehicle Stop 
• Vehicle Stop – Fill Requested 
• Bar Check 
• Report of Blight Conditions 
• Follow-up 
• Foot Patrol 
• Patrol Check 
• Park Patrol 
• Radar Trailer 
• Search Warrants 
• Traffic Enforcement 
• Warrant Service 
• Parole/Probation Violation 
 
Services and Activity 
 
The Services and Activity report is a summary of specific types of calls for service and/or 
officer-initiated activity. The call may or may not have resulted in a written police report. An 
example of this would be an alarm call that resulted in a burglary. The alarm call would be 
tallied on the Services and Activity report under “Alarms” and the burglary crime report would 
generate a burglary statistic on the Crime Statistics Report (Part I Crimes). 
Alarms 
Includes all alarm calls for service 
 
Animal Services 
Includes all calls for service related to animals. 
 
Assist Outside Police Agencies/Other City Depts 
All calls for service where officers assist other police agencies, or City Departments. 
 
Attended/Unattended Deaths 






City Ordinance Violations 
All City Ordinance Violations including Blight conditions. 
 
Disturbances 
All calls for service involving a disturbance. 
 
Fire Calls 
All calls for service involving a fire or wire down. This category does not include Medical Calls. 
 
Graffiti 
All calls for service reporting graffiti. 
 
Lost & Found Property 
All reports of lost or found property. 
 
Malicious Mischief 
Al reports of vandalism or attempted vandalism. 
 
Medical calls 
All calls for service related to medical conditions. 
 
Mental Health 
All calls for service involving subjects with mental disorders. 
 
Missing Persons 
All reports of missing persons including adults and juveniles. 
 
Special Public Contacts 
All calls related to public service including escorts, requests to meet with an officer, bar checks, 
civil details, civil stand-bys, foot patrol, patrol check, park patrol, public relations details, vehicle 
lock-outs, and welfare checks.  
 
Subpoenas 
All calls related to service of subpoenas including attempts to serve subpoenas. 
 
Suicides 
All reported suicides. 
 
Suicides – Attempted 
All reported suicide attempts. 
 
Suspicious Circumstances 
All calls for service related to suspicious circumstances. 
 





All calls for service related to traffic complaints by a citizen. 
 
Traffic Enforcement – Directed Activity 
All directed activity related to traffic enforcement. Does not include traffic stops.  
 
Traffic Stops 
All traffic stops by officers. 
 
Unclassified Services 
All other miscellaneous or special details. 
 
Warrants 
All warrant services and attempts to serve warrants. This category does not include warrants that 




All 911 calls received including abandoned and hang-up calls. 
 
Police Reports 
Total number of written police reports including accident reports. This number is generated by 
the total number of OCA numbers issued. 
 
False Alarm Revenues 
Total amount of revenues received for false alarms. 
 
Bike Patrol Hours 
Total number of staff hours dedicated to bike patrol. 
 
Reserve Hours 
Total number of reserve officer hours.  
Explorer Hours 
Total number of explorer hours. 
 
Number of Training Hours 





Total number of adults arrested by CPD including bookings, cite & release, etc. 
 
Juveniles 
Total number of juvenile arrests including bookings, cite and release, etc. 
 






Figure P: Campbell Crime Rate Per 10,000 Inhabitants (2010-2019) 
  
Source: (CPD Department Statistics, 2005-2019). 
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Figure Q: CPD Statistics (2005-2012) 
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Figure R: CPD Statistics (2013-2019) 
 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure S: CPD Statistics and Percent Change by Year (2005-2009) 
 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure T: CPD Statistics and Percent Change by Year (2010-2014) 
 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure U: CPD Statistics and Percent Change by Year (2015-2019) 
 
Source: (CPD Department Statistics, 2015-2019). 
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